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LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN

1899

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CHAPTER I

THE TRUE BASIS OF MILITARISM

AN extra-planetary observer of the superficial movements of earth's inhabitants would have been considerably puzzled during the last few weeks. He would have noticed a reaction of amazing rapidity and of vast dimensions. For some years the war-clouds have been lowering more darkly on the horizon; the air has been heavier and feverish; the tension and dread of the lurid flash have shown themselves in a thousand ways. The nations have spent two-thirds of their blood and sweat and genius in arming themselves against each other, and have paraded their arms and armour in each other's sight, in "reviews" and "naval displays," with the proud menace of mediæval knights. Rulers and statesmen have lightly fingered messages that were well calculated to inaugurate the great Armageddon. And, suddenly, the Press passes from the topic of universal war to the glad

message of universal peace. Floods of literature and oratory are poured out to convince us that disarmament is practicable, and that the knell of militarism has sounded at last.

Of the startling pronouncement of the Tsar which has occasioned this transformation there are many opinions. In a world which is so thoroughly imbued with Christian principles as the Church Congress assures us we are, one would expect the document to be taken at its surface value. The Congress, consistently, and many other equally guileless bodies and individuals, do accept it as a sincere and fervid expression of the young monarch's sentiments. In more worldly spheres the opinion does not seem to be very widely shared. The Tsar is an autocrat, it is true; but even Russian autocracy has sadly degenerated. One cannot think that the Tsar, in his first fit of self-consciousness, would write in the teeth of the able, not very sentimental, bureaucracy that presides over the destinies of his country. Possibly Count Muravieff indulged him in what he considered to be a harmless "cracker." Other negligible opinions are: that the Tsar wanted to "go one better" than the Kaiser in advertising; that the Russian war-chest was depleted by the construction of the Siberian railway; that it was another Muscovite attempt to hoodwink English statesmen, etc.

The general impression in political and journalistic spheres is that the document has a political significance. Russia is not in the habit of disseminating sentimental literature. But what that significance may be is far from clear. That is one of the humours of the New Diplomacy. Take a document, especially a Russian document, at its surface value, as the honest Englishman is inclined to do, and you may look for complications. Hence, we have the interesting spectacle of the Tsar's "noble and straightforward" appeal being subjected to a microscopic scrutiny in every civilized capital, and yielding a curious collection of results. The political considerations which follow in the next and the fifth chapters may be useful in deciphering it.

But, whatever may be the value of the document which has occasioned the present agitation, the question of disarmament is the serious topic of the hour. The advocates of peace have found it politic to assume, at least, that the sentiment is sincere, and they are infusing a new vigour into their Propaganda, with a view to influencing, or imparting a touch of sincerity to the coming Council of Peace. Their familiar arguments are re-arrayed, and are enforced by the still thrilling horror of recent events. Our artists and word-painters have singularly shrunk from depicting the ghastly features of war: Mrs. Butler rather

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of their age, continually in arms. A vastly larger army is absorbed, all life long, in feeding, clothing, transporting, and equipping her soldiers. The outbreak of war would suck almost the blood from her heart. Look at bloodless, exhausted Spain, or Greece. The English wars against Napoleon imposed a debt of £581,000,000 on succeeding generations. What would a European war cost to-day?—and translate the figures into human brain and muscle. The late war—a feeble vision of what is to come—is said to have cost America 250,000,000 dollars. We are told to imagine, for one bright moment, the total abolition of war and standing armies, and conceive the energy which would be directed to the beautifying of the garden of earth. The gods must smile at the grim contest between armour-plate manufacturers and projectile manufacturers, between the compounders of explosives, between systems of espionage, of attack, and of defence.

On the other hand, war has its advocates. Not only case-hardened military men, but even peaceable scholars, subscribe to the gospel of war. Mr. Frederic Harrison, the distinguished representative of the Religion of Humanity in England, took the chair at a lecture, a few months ago, in which Dr. Maguire strenuously advocated the cause of militarism. One can follow the reasoning of an historian on such a point. Every

nation has become great through war, and has hopelessly degenerated and sown the seeds of corruption as soon as peace was established. The fate of Assyrians, Persians, Romans, and Moslems is a pertinent and an eloquent witness. Kingsley ably depicts the process in the case of the Goths in *Hypatia*. War is a superb factor in the development of strength, bravery, and endurance. One wonders how those qualities, of whose vital importance history so sternly admonishes us, would be developed in an age of universal peace. If you abolish war, they say, you do so at the price of atrophy of the sinews of modern civilization. In any case, the military training has a specific value quite apart from the grim school of the battle-field. The national physique has an enviable distinction in those races which have compulsory service. Even morally the advantages are great. Said Carlyle to Kingsley when the Volunteer Movement began—"'Tis a good thing for all that number of men to get themselves washed and cleaned and used to punctual habits." The military system, especially in the great national armies, brings a large proportion of the "lower orders" into contact with the intellectual aristocracy of the community every year; and not only into contact, but into an ideal submissiveness and docility which give a vast power to mould and develop and educate.

Such are the arguments with which the Peace Societies and their critics appeal to rulers and to subjects. That such considerations, long familiar to all educated people, are little likely to influence the designs of rulers and statesmen, few will doubt—apart from the subscribers to those Peace Societies which have written to congratulate the Tsar on his graceful surrender to their efforts. Nominal autocracy still lingers amongst forms of government; the "representative" character of certain republics and limited monarchies is open to serious question. Still, the practical agitator directs himself to the conversion of the masses. Academic bodies, sitting at Turin, and gravely impressing upon each other their academic arguments—even quarrelling as to what measure of pacification they shall recommend,—are in small danger of influencing the course of events.

If the only difficulty lay in the apathy of the people—the usual *bête noire* of the reformer—the success of the present agitation would be assured. There is more rhetorical fire and more persuasive power in the horrors and burdens of war than in any evil that ever cried for redress. But the people are not indifferent. Those who seek the basis of militarism merely in an indolent acceptance of tradition (which is responsible for one-half of our institutions) are hopelessly incorrect. The people are responsible for the military sys-

tem they groan under to-day, and they are keenly interested in it. And it would be equally incorrect to seek the basis of the system in the *sentiments* of the people. Certainly we cannot ignore the emotional element of the problem, the wave of sentiment—a veritable tidal-wave in time of war—that surges through the crowd at military events and military spectacles. The instinct that has been planted deep in the human frame by, perhaps, 100,000 years of carnage cannot be eradicated in a decade nor a century. Still, if war and militarism rested on a purely emotional basis, the problem would be far from hopeless. It would be merely a work of education, in which the power and the perfection of the modern press would be of incalculable service. Sentiment may be silenced by sentiment.

But what the advocates of disarmament have failed to recognize, in their academic speeches and aërial resolutions, is the fact that this determination of the people has its *raison d'être* in the tangible and very considerable profit they derive from the military system. The Peace Congresses are held too near the clouds. It is consoling to take human affairs in the abstract and argue that, militarism being evidently the huge Moloch of modern civilization, its dethronement will bring back an infinity of energy to its legitimate channel—the raising of the standard of

individual happiness. It is a very pretty and an incontestable theory. But in the actual conduct of life, great streams of energy cannot be diverted and converted with quite the ease that M. Passy seems to think. Rigidity, and stability, and a serene and venerable changelessness, may be admirable qualities of an economic system; but they absolutely exclude such measures as the abolition of militarism. We talk of our industrial *system*. Our industries do *not* form a system, and most of us violently protest that they never shall. They are a vast congeries of not only isolated but mutually hostile elements. That is as it should be, of course; but it is obvious that it precludes any such transformation of the industrial world as is involved in the idea of disarmament. The military system is so deeply rooted in our economic "system," it constitutes so enormous a proportion of that system and is so important both to capital and labour, that no power is strong enough to tear it out. The ensuing chaos is appalling to contemplate. Theoretically there only needs some fairy-power to redistribute or redirect the abandoned stream of capital and labour. But there is no such power. The State cannot do it. One would think we were living in a socialistic community to listen to the airy suggestions of some reformers. No; the paralysis of the economic world would be

appalling, and the people—*bourgeoisie* and proletariat—will prefer to bear the burden of militarism rather than face industrial anarchy. It will tell its academic advisers to work out the economic consequences of disarmament first.

And there are political considerations which would of themselves preclude any degree of disarmament at the present day. The ultra-humane feelings of the peacemakers seem to prevent them from appreciating the real condition of the political world. The unceasing growth of Socialism has presented some European rulers with a political problem of the highest importance. The peacemakers seem to think that the question of disarmament is quite unconnected with it. Journals of high standing, in furthering the agitation, declare that Europe was never nearer a state of political equilibrium. They speak with some diffidence of France. As if France only had a grievous thorn in her side! Every country in Europe has an acute territorial difficulty, quite as troublesome as the problem of Alsace-Lorraine. This will be abundantly clear if we take a broad survey of the political world, before proceeding into the economic aspect of the question.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO DISARMAMENT

One of the first effects of any practical measures for a reduction of armaments will be the clearer definition and the development of a grave impediment to it in the mass of the people. It is too frequently lost sight of that the change from the moderate pretorian armies of earlier years to the huge national armies of the present day means far more than an increased expenditure. It has introduced a new element, a change of extreme significance, into the political situation: it has unconsciously put a power in the hands of the mass of the people, the "subjects," such as has no parallel in history—or only a faint parallel in certain periods of Roman history. Under the older system (as in our own military system to-day) the army was an instrument, quite apart from the mass of the people, entirely in the hands of the rulers. Nation did not fight with nation. It detailed its military executive

to deal, offensively or defensively, with the corresponding machinery of its enemy. Most of the civilized nations of to-day have returned to a more primitive type—to the national army, *la nation armée*, as it has been more properly named.

In speaking of the change, Baron Von der Goltz says—"War appears in our day, as a rule, in its natural shape, that is, as the bloody collision of nations, in which each of the parties in the fight aims at the entire overthrow, or, if possible, the destruction of its adversary. . . . We can now-a-days no longer imagine wars of mere strategical manœuvres without decisive battles, and just as little can we imagine wars in which the States in conflict do not employ their whole force and do not intend to overthrow the enemy, but merely to use a portion of their forces for the attainment of some limited point which alone interests them. Such a procedure can be rationally conceived only if the object of the conflict is of the most trifling nature. But now-a-days trifles will not lead to war at all. If such a thing should exceptionally occur, through mistakes of the disputing governments, the irritated national sentiments of the two peoples will come into play to prevent the issue of the war being settled by the defeat of a mere small portion of their forces. Public opinion will insist

upon their reinforcement: the enemy will take a similar course; and thus, by degrees, in spite of the original intention, the whole forces of both sides will be engaged. Now that States pretty closely correspond to nationalities, they have come to resemble persons who would rather lose life than honour." And take the assurance of the late refined Chancellor that, when France and Germany resume their quarrel, they will not cease "until they have bled each other as white as veal."

Modern Europe went on a civilizing expedition to Africa. It has brought back and set up in Europe the military organization of the African tribes. Almost the whole manhood of every nation, except England, is absorbed in the military system. Rulers and ruled are gradually awakening to the fact that this circumstance invests the masses with a new power. Suppose the rulers, not entirely conscious that they study the interests of the masses very closely, regret the change, and would return to the pretorian armies of former days; will the people tamely submit? The unconscious acquisition of this power by the people is interesting.

The rise of national armies dates from the Franco-German war. In 1868, Russia, France, Austria, Italy, Germany, had a military expenditure of £89,000,000. Now, the same Powers

spend £175,000,000 per year on their armaments. Before the Franco-German war, the armies of those five Powers, on a war footing, amounted to about 4,500,000 men: to-day they number 17,500,000. The national debt of France has increased since the war from £500,000,000 to £1,260,000,000. The Russian national debt has increased from £300,000,000 to £900,000,000. The German national debt, a comparatively recent growth, is already £600,000,000.

So far, then, were the horrors of the war (France alone lost 300,000 soldiers, and a further 328,000 persons, indirectly, through the war) from leading to a desire for disarmament, that the modern Juggernaut only began its triumphant march in earnest from that date. The causes of this are manifold; partly political, partly economic, partly emotional ("patriotic," one ought to say). In the first place, there was the luminous fact that Germany, through the brilliant success which her superior armament gave her, sprang at once to a foremost place amongst the powers of Europe. The indemnity of 5,743,000,000 francs went far towards paying the expenses of the war, and she entered at once upon a period of prosperity far beyond her hopes. She had obtained at length the long-desired security of her frontier. She had an outlet for her commerce on the German Ocean; the pres-

tige of her victory inspired her with the hope of attaining a further outlet on the Adriatic. From an agricultural land she rapidly transformed herself into industrial. The nine months of the siege of Paris and the Commune had stifled Parisian industry, and given birth to German industrial enterprise. The seventh article of the Treaty of Frankfort had secured for her a "most-favoured-nation" treatment with France and the French colonies. Her industries and commerce made gigantic strides—even in Berlin which the Emperor desired to preserve untainted: those of France sank in proportion. The German mercantile marine, which scarcely existed before '70, is now the second in Europe: that of France has fallen behind that of Greece. Since 1849 France had held the second rank in imports and exports: she now holds the fifth. In exports France has struggled to-day to the position she held in 1865. During the last fifteen years France has decreased her commercial figures by about 22 per cent.: Germany has increased hers by nearly 40 per cent. Germany advanced, consistently, in social legislation and even in intellectual prestige. The spectacle of so marvellous a prosperity, as a direct result of the war, could not but inspire a military ardour throughout Germany. Even had the Government hesitated to increase the armament until the army had become national—an

armed nation—rather than pretorian, it is scarcely likely they could have resisted the popular enthusiasm. The vanquished nation was bitterly crying for a *revanche;* other nations were rapidly applying the moral. It was absolutely necessary to create the national army. The German peace army to-day numbers more than half-a-million men.

The French nation, at the other end of the balance, was inspired with a similar zeal for militarism. A new generation has replaced the soldiers of '70-1, but the spectre of *revanche* haunts the nation as banefully as ever, and lures them on, in spite of a stationary population and a commercial depression, to enormous sacrifices to the Moloch of militarism. The nation raged at the discovery of its military inferiority, rejected its nominal ruler, rushed into civil war against the "Capitulards" who had sold its honour and sacrificed its territory. There was only one means for the Government to meet the volcanic wrath of the people—the creation of a national army; and they proceeded forthwith to its construction—on paper. So intense was the popular feeling, that the Government had concealed some of the clauses of the Treaty of Frankfort from them. Baron de Billing, Secretary of the Commission at Strasburg, says in one of his letters—"Bien coupables sont ceux qui ont caché aux

Français les clauses secrètes du traité de Francfort! Je me demande si la France n'aurait pas encore bondi sous de tels coups et ne se fut brusquement réveillée! . . . La Prusse victorieuse nous interdit, pour un nombre d'années que je n'ose pas citer, d'avoir sous les drapeaux nos effectifs d'hommes au complet. Toute notre armée n'existe que sur le papier. Nous n'avons pas le droit d'en avoir une, et l'Allemagne, sans crainte, rit de nous en dessous main. Tout ce qui se publie est fantasmagorie pour satisfaire un public de gogos." A Government that secretly accepted such conditions of peace, in addition to the crushing indemnity, etc., could only trust to meet public opinion by creating an enormous army. The old recruiting system of the Empire (by drawing lots) was abolished, and compulsory service was decreed. For many years the number was kept down (in compliance with the secret clause) by exemptions, colonial expeditions, etc., but France has at length become a *nation armée* in the strictest sense. She has an active army of more than half a million, and three lines of reserve—altogether three millions and a quarter of her finest sons. Confronted daily with the remnants of her sullied flag, her lost provinces, and the ever-increasing prosperity of her rival, France is utterly incapable of laying aside her warlike sentiments.

Thus the great modern armaments arose in obedience to the voice of the people. Germany, in addition to the popular impulse already given, was bound to keep ahead of France in military organization. The moral of the campaign was not lost on the neighbouring Powers. They had an eloquent warning of the danger of military inferiority. The modern struggle for supremacy set in in earnest. In almost every country military service became compulsory—if one may call that compulsory which was decreed in obvious deference to popular clamour. The peculiar position of England makes it appear exceptional, though, in reality, it is merely a question of substituting navy for army. But in every other country the army lost its pretorian character, ceased to be a distinct and subsidiary instrument, easy of manipulation by the ruling class, and embraced, substantially, the whole manhood of the nation in its colossal growth.

From the earliest days of the movement the ruling classes must have foreseen the dangers of arming entire nations. At that time the one idea of foreign aggression so completely dominated the people's minds that their thoughts never went beyond it. But there were signs innumerable of unrest and discontent in the ranks of the toilers. Socialism was advancing with rapid steps: even revolutionary doctrines were openly

propagated. Once the people became conscious of the enormous power which the modern armament put in their hands, it were hard to predict what use they might not make of it. In essence and tendency the national army was democratic. It would not be strange if it came one day to reject the last trace of oligarchic organization, and demanded to be put on a democratic basis. Who would resist an organized expression of its will? An armed people, returning from victory with the vivid consciousness of its irresistible power, could make a mockery of the police authority of the governing aristocracy, if it so willed. One never knew the day when the people would awake to a consciousness of this power, would allow itself to be persuaded that its interests were in no wise consulted by the ruling monarch or aristocracy, and would claim a larger share in the material and moral wealth which it had conquered or preserved.

It was clearly, then, the interest of the Government to retain the pretorian armies of earlier years. Its hand was forced by the people in every country, and it had to create national armies. It only remained to use every means to prevent the birth of this consciousness of power on the part of the people, and to give the army a tyrannical oligarchic organization. In Germany, especially, where the discontent of the mass of

the industrial community has been most menacing, the exclusivism of the officers has been most severe. They form a distinct caste, which is rigidly closed against all who do not profess their sentiments and religion. Jews are unable to penetrate it. Until recently there was only one Roman Catholic general of a brigade in the entire Prussian army: not a single general of a division is Roman Catholic. When a man rises from the ranks (which is very rare) or comes from the military school, he cannot enter a regiment unless he is elected by the officers. Judaism or advanced opinions are an insurmountable obstacle: Roman Catholicism frequently excludes. This system strictly preserves the exclusivism of the Prussian army, and practically gives it a pretorian character, in spite of the efforts of democrats. And the Prussian army is the main strength of the German forces, supplying nearly all the superior and general officers. Moreover, the Emperor takes every possible opportunity to emphasize the distinction between the army and the nation, *i. e.* to blind the masses to their practical identity. He recently insisted, with edifying emphasis, that the soldier must be prepared to shoot his father and mother at the imperial command. In France, the tyranny of the officers, and the ferocity, sometimes barbarity, of the disciplinary measures, are notorious. The

picture of the *compagnies de discipline* in the well-known work (*Biribi*) of M. Darien is revolting in the extreme. But the state of the French army will be treated more fully in the fourth chapter.

It is not so much socialism strictly so called, Marxism, "scientific" or "state" socialism, that the Governments fear. In reality the ruling classes have succeeded in turning this to advantage. State socialism attacks the army as an institution. The socialist leaders seem to forget that the army has lost its pretorian character. They continue to regard it in the character which it presented when socialism, the "International Association of Workers," began, in 1868. That was before the Franco-German war and the rise of national armies. At that time the army was an instrument in the hands of the ruling or capitalist class. It was natural that the socialists should declare war against such an institution, and concentrate their efforts on an effective representation in Parliament. Later socialists, of the "scientific" type, whose horizon is narrowed through their concentration on a single economic problem, have not appreciated the modifications of the political situation. Their anxiety about parliamentary representation shows that they fail to see the true source of power of modern aristocracies. Government will not seriously fear them

so long as they neglect the executive, administrative, and military machinery in which its real power lies. And the socialist attacks on the military system are not formidable. They forget its national character, and thus they ignore (and help the Government to restrain) the true feeling of the masses on the question.

A new socialism is springing up, wider in its view than the old Marxism, uniting moral and political consideration to economic, more practical and flexible. Such a movement would be likely to take into account the vague, but growing consciousness of the masses, and render it articulate. Agitators may not succeed in imposing their constructive theories, but they do succeed in spreading social and political unrest and a mutual distrust of rulers and ruled. If this tendency becomes more accentuated, as there is every reason to think, the possession of so vast a power by the manhood of the lower class offers grave matter for reflection.

Here we have one plausible explanation of the Tsar's manifesto. It has been suggested that the desire for a reduction of armaments indicates an anxiety at the increasing power of the enlisted people, and covers a political move for the reconversion of national armies into pretorian. On such a theory it is not impossible that there was a distinct understanding amongst the con-

tinental governments, and that the proposed conference was already seriously accepted by some of them. This would impart a touch of sincerity to the famous proclamation. Whether the Tsar's effusive language were to be taken literally or not, one could understand the ease and calmness of Count Muravieff and his colleagues in launching the manifesto. There are economic reasons, as we shall see, which gravely complicate the problem for governments which are bound up with the *bourgeoisie*. In France such a proposition for a reduction of the army would immediately wreck the Government. In Germany it would be a difficult and delicate undertaking. The Russian Government regards neither *bourgeoisie* nor proletariat in the pursuit of its object. Hence it is not the least probable of the many interpretations of the manifesto that the rulers of some of the "armed nations" felt it desirable, for their own security, to reduce the army to the pretorian and convenient character which it had before the war of '70-1, and wished to disarm the suspicions of the masses by starting with a semi-religious manifesto of so innocent a complexion.

Whether that be true or not, a grave impediment to even a partial disarmament will be found in the masses of the people. Their slowly-awakening consciousness of power will be

quickened and defined in discussing the new proposal. The fallacy of the socialistic agitation will be discovered (and is already largely perceived), and they will come to realize the change they have unconsciously made in the political world by the creation of national armies. It is not such a sentiment as is likely to be ever distinctly formulated amongst the definite objections to disarmament, yet, none the less will it weigh in the minds of the masses, when they are confronted with practical measures. It is a political obstacle to disarmament—to any reduction of armament—of no slight importance.

But the political world offers obstacles to disarmament of a much more obvious and substantial character. There are peacemakers who console each other with the assurance that Europe is in a most promising condition of political equilibrium. One needs the optimism of a Leibnitz to acquiesce in such a statement. Alsace-Lorraine is grudgingly admitted to be a source of apprehension. Is there a country in Europe that has not its Alsace-Lorraine? The map of Europe to-day contains innumerable dismembered fragments, torn from their natural body by war or coercive congresses or diplomatic intrigue. Frequently, too, these provinces have a more vital and inalienable connection with their mistress than Alsace and Lorraine have with

France: Alsace, at least, is thoroughly German, and neither province has suffered a shade of oppression from the conqueror. There is not a single country in Europe that is in a state of equilibrium, such as would permit even a partial disarmament. Every nation has either lost a province which it hopes to regain, or gained one which it fears to lose: most frequently both circumstances compel it to maintain a full measure of armament.

Germany is one of the most obvious sources of trouble to the peacemakers on account of the two provinces she wrested from France in 1871. These provinces, the permanent memorial of her military success, she will never voluntarily retrocede. Moreover, she claims them as a natural part of her territory and her race, much more closely related to her than to France. But it is sometimes forgotten that Germany is even more justified in coveting certain other provinces than Alsace. In the south her desire for the annexation of German Austria is apparent. It is equally clear that the German portion of Austria will respond to her aspirations at the death of the Emperor—the frail link that now unites two increasingly hostile races. Once that link is broken, it is not difficult to tell what will happen. Germany will intervene: pacifically, if the solution be pacific—but it may well be otherwise. She will

not, in either case, neglect to find an opportunity of prosecuting her scheme for the federation of all sections of the German race, and of creeping down to the shores of the southern waters. To the north, again, Germany has a grave ambition to extend her frontiers. The Russian Baltic provinces are thoroughly German in race, language, and religion. Until quite recently the inhabitants of these provinces have been grievously persecuted by Russia, in its endeavour to stamp out their German character and aspirations. On November 22, 1896, M. Pobiedonostoff, Procurator of the Holy Synod, wrote as follows to the Home Office at St. Petersburg—"The orthodox Russian Church is sufficiently established and spread in the Baltic provinces to-day to allow the abrogation of the *extra-judicial* measures which have been in force up to the present day against the Lutheran Protestants of these countries." What *extra-judicial* measures are in Russia, and especially in the hands of M. Pobiedonostoff, may be left to the imagination of the reader. *Judicial* measures, it would seem, are still enforced upon them. Under such circumstances the Livonians instinctively turn to their brothers in race and religion. Germany cannot be insensible to the possibilities of the situation, and, although present circumstances naturally lead to a concealment of any such

aspiration, it is sure to be entertained in the plans and hopes of her rulers.

Russia, on the other hand, has more than one province which can only be retained by force, and which is coveted by neighbouring powers. Besides Courland and Livonia, she has a third source of trouble in Finland. Finland was formerly a province of Sweden, and it remains thoroughly Swedish in religion, sentiments, and language. Like Courland and Livonia, it is crushed by Russia mercilessly in an endeavour to destroy its natural character. It looks to Sweden for relief, and Sweden, at present utterly helpless before the huge Russian armament, is not insensible to the appeal. That Russia would ever entertain the idea of pacifically retroceding these recalcitrant and unassimilable provinces is impossible. She would cut herself off from the Baltic. And whilst this acute inflammation on her western border (including Poland) demands an imposing military array, there are problems on every side of her vast dominions which intensify the demand. No one can foretell the hour when the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire may commence, and a show of superior force alone will secure for Russia the coveted extension southwards. A similar problem engages her attention in China. Indeed, with her vast and precarious designs along the whole of her

Asiatic frontier, on Persia, India, and China, one would have thought Russia the last power in the world to speak of reducing armaments. Even her diplomatic successes in China would never have been secured but for the proximity of her vast army. It is daily becoming apparent that it was a system of bluff, and would have been utterly ineffective if M. Pavloff had not continually reminded the Yamen of the troops in Manchuria.

Italy is just as far removed from a condition of political equilibrium. The idea of a united Italy has only been partially realized, and the actual union is threatened with serious dangers. Austria has contributed much to the union (and she is not likely to forget it), but the process is not yet complete. When the unification began in 1856, Austria ceded Lombardy, as the price of her defeat, but Italy had to cede Nice and Savoy to France for her assistance. There was a plebiscite, it is true, yet the fact remains that the House of Savoy does not possess its fief. In 1866 Austria had to yield Venetia to France, as a result of the Austro-Prussian war (be it remembered that Lombardy and Venetia are as much Austrian as Alsace is French): France added it to united Italy. In 1870 the Papal States were united, again by force, with the formality of a plebiscite. Bismarck let Victor Emmanuel occupy them as the price of his neutrality in the Franco-

Prussian war. Thus has Italy gathered its provinces in fragments from neighbouring powers; what it has gathered by the sword must be held by the sword. In no instance is this more true than in face of that purely spiritual and peace-making power—the Papacy. The uniting of the Papal States under the Italian flag has given an "Alsace-Lorraine" to the entire Catholic world. Moreover, the same idea that armed Italy against her neighbours—the idea of uniting all provinces of Italian race under one flag—is still far from inactive. A large party, headed by Imbriani, clamours for the annexation of Trent and Trieste. Corsica and Malta are still more natural elements of the Italian federation.

Amongst the minor Powers we find, in every case, the same sources of trouble and instability. Denmark has its eyesore in Schleswig-Holstein, taken from it by the Austro-Prussian army in 1864 for the eventual construction of the Kiel Canal. Holland has not forgotten the wresting of Antwerp from it by the French army in 1830: Belgium must retain it by the same law by which it was acquired—the law of might. Turkey is far from reconciled to her loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina—as was patent in her re-occupation of Thessaly. Greece will never rest until she has annexed Crete, at least: she manifestly bows only to superior force. Spain, as recent events have

clearly confirmed, casts covetous eyes upon Gibraltar. Norway is in the throes of a dangerous agitation for independence.

We need not go beyond Europe for evidence of the extreme instability of the political world at the present moment. The only equilibrium which any but a roseate optimist can see is a precarious equilibrium of force. The first inducement to break that equilibrium will be a relaxation of military activity on the part of one of the nations that has squeezed a province out of its neighbour. There are those who speak hopefully of the plebiscite as a solution, or aid to the solution, of this knotty problem of lost provinces. We have recently had a striking illustration of its practical value. At the time of the opening of the Kiel Canal, M. Goblet, in the French Chamber, made an allusion to it in a famous speech. Saying that a nation has no right to complain of a defeat, he went on—"Mais ce qui constitue un juste grief, c'est le droit violé ; et il y a violation de droit, violation des principes de la justice internationale moderne, quand des populations civilisées sont arrachées par la force à leur patrie ; leurs nouvelles destinées ne peuvent être légitimement consacrées que quand elles sont ratifiées par leur consentement." There were few in France who did not suspect, at least, that a plebiscite taken in Alsace-Lorraine would destroy the last

remnant of French hope, hence M. Goblet's suggestion was rejected with immediate indignation. "Ainsi," said the French press, "si l'Alsace-Lorraine ratifiait son annexion par un plébiscite, la France n'aurait plus à considérer cette annexion que comme un fait accompli, définitif, et ne laissant place à aucun espoir. Nous n'accepterons jamais cela! Nous n'accepterons jamais que les destinées de l'Alsace-Lorraine puissent être décidées par un plébiscite." How would Russia like the idea of a plebiscite in Poland, Livonia, or Finland? Would England submit to a plebiscite in Ireland, or Spain in the Philippines, or Turkey in Armenia? In such a case as the Province of Nice, which is, in every sense, midway between the two great Latin races, such a proceeding is feasible (when no question of the honour of the ceding nation is involved). That is quite an exception amongst the territorial disputes of the nations. Usually it has become a question of national honour, in the mind of the nation, and one wastes one's breath in talking of arbitration or plebiscites. Every nation has sworn that it will submit only to the bloody arbitration of the sword (a euphemism for Maxims, Liddite shells, and dynamite guns) questions which affect national honour and the integrity of its territory. The present map of Europe was traced in blood.

Connected with these territorial problems are the difficulties which arise from commercial expansion and colonization. The love of adventure and of fame, that led to the colonization and appropriation of the lands of distant nations in earlier years, has been superseded by a more formidable power. Indeed, colonies of the older type have now to be entirely relieved of the character of conquered and subject dominions. In proportion as they are permeated with the civilization of their mother countries, they must have their chains lightened and gilded, until the relation finally reaches its fated stage of federation. However, there are still important colonies, such as India, which will sustain the military strain of more than one nation for many years to come. But the commercial expansion of modern communities introduces a new and equally disquieting element into the situation. It was an easy matter, in earlier years, to decline responsibility for an adventurous explorer, when circumstances made it expedient; his relation to his country was one of extreme elasticity and convenience. To-day we have colonial offices and colonial secretaries. Colonizing expeditions, or their modern equivalent, are in almost hourly touch with a responsible government (though France, with her Marchands and Prince Henris, seems to favour still the

older type). A State spreads out its tentacles or arms into distant lands; he who injures them finds himself in vital contact with the body.

The result is that friction between two adventurous parties of opposing nations is more dangerous than ever. The recent *rencontre* of Kitchener and Marchand at Fashoda sent a thrill of anger, menace, and defiance through the two nations, even before the facts of the case were known. All over the world we have similar dangers to confront. Frontiers are undefined, large tracts of territory are not yet appropriated by Europeans, detached portions of the great European armies are in hourly danger of collision. Moreover, older empires, that offer an alluring field to commercial enterprise, are breaking up. Europe has thrown its many arms round China like a huge octopus; but the arms are not vitally related to each other, they are mortally hostile. A crisis may be reached any day in China or Turkey, and then—unlucky the Power that can make the least imposing show of strength. And if the crisis tarries, it is easy to precipitate it, or secure concessions in advance, by the methods of the "New Diplomacy." Send a few insulting and irritating missionaries where they are sure to earn the palm of martyrdom—the rest lies with the ambassador. And *we* talk glibly of the ancient traffic in relics.

The would-be disarmers have great faith in the peaceable methods of diplomacy and arbitration. The feeling does credit to their humanity, but not to their wisdom. Diplomacy and arbitration are capable of dealing with many difficulties, and thus lessen the chances of a bloody arbitrament, but these are only a few out of the vast crowd of modern political problems. It might be objected, too, that a solution by arbitration is ignored by any party in a dispute which is conspicuously the stronger (America *versus* Spain, or the Welsh coal-owners *versus* the miners), and, further, that the verdict is only accepted by the loser in so far as he can be coerced (Colombia and Italy, Chili and Argentina). But it is sufficient to point out that so long as there is a class of difficulties which nations will not submit to arbitration or discussion, disarmament is impossible. Every nation, as we said, emphatically declares that there are questions affecting its honour which it would never submit to any other arbitrament than that of 5-inch shells. Questions of territory are notoriously included in that category. In fact, the nations of Europe seem to be becoming more sensitive every year to national honour (in this connection only), and seem disposed to magnify the most trivial incidents into *casus belli*. As Baron Von der Goltz says, when

trifles have led to friction, "the irritated national sentiments come into play." By a kind of reflex principle, it becomes a question of national honour, and diplomatists have to yield to the anger of the people. We have seen a Government (America) forced into war against its will within the last few months. Hence, although diplomacy may legitimately hope to smooth out many of the formidable array of difficulties, or possible difficulties, of the present political situation, there is a large number which could not be settled, if they arise, otherwise than by the law of superior force. When one remembers the unnatural and distorted condition of the present map of Europe, the unalterable discontent of entire races (Poland, Finland, Norway, Ireland), the intense rivalry and feverish activity abroad of the great Powers, it is utterly impossible to follow the disarmers in their unsubstantial visions.

None but fanatics dream of *universal* disarmament at the present stage; but is a reduction of armaments possible? Let us take the matter practically. The *Daily Chronicle*, at least, evidently believes in its practicability. A reduction of armaments could only be effected by common agreement of the great Powers. They are supposed to "groan" under the weight of their armaments (how promptly they responded

to the Tsar's appeal!) Well, then, what could be the basis of agreement? Will they agree to maintain the present proportional distribution of power? Will the continental powers deliberately grant England a naval superiority over France, Germany, and Russia? Will France promise never to attempt to rise to the military position of Germany? The idea is too absurd for consideration; but is the alternative less absurd? Is it easier to imagine that the stronger powers will voluntarily abdicate their superiority and come down to the level of the weaker? Reduce the German army to the level of the French, or the British navy to the level of the Russian? But suppose they *were* induced by some mysterious power to decree a common level. We should be a thousand times nearer war than ever. France would pick a quarrel with Germany within three months of the reduction, etc., etc. Equality of force is all that France and many other nations are waiting for. It is not a question of whether diplomacy can smooth existing difficulties or not (in which there is room for the Christian virtues of faith and hope). The plain question is, Is the reduction to be on a basis of equalization of force, or inequality, as at present, but on a lower scale? The stronger nations could never accept the former alternative, and they would precipitate the dread Armageddon,

if they did: the weaker nations, scarred and embittered, would never agree to bind themselves to a perennial inferiority—and they could not be trusted if they did. Reduction of armaments by mutual agreement is a Quixotic dream. It is more hopeless than the abolition of war altogether. One needs a faith of the mountain-moving type to think that the nations will sit in common conclave, and renounce all their efforts to outstrip each other—to invent a higher explosive, or a ghastlier bullet, or a stouter armour, or a more skilfully murderous gun, than their neighbours. It is a question of the abolition of war or nothing.

Nor can much faith be put in alliances. If one path towards disarmament were less hopeless than another, it would seem to be that of alliance. If five great Powers could enter into a true and stable alliance, they could reduce their armaments, absorb a multitude of minor Powers of a contented temper, police the world, and pave the way towards peace. The only five Powers that one could imagine in such a connection are the United States, England, Germany, Russia, and Japan. Insuperable difficulties stand in the way of such an alliance at present, but they are not eternal. However, that is not in the field of practical politics, and no other alliance would answer. It could only provoke a counter-alliance.

Indeed, the essential insecurity of any alliance forbids us to put our trust of redemption in it. The Triple Alliance only needs some such circumstance as the division of Austria to declare itself dissolved. The Dual Alliance has already lost much of its gilt and ardour.

In conclusion, consider the position of England on the question of reduction. There is much talk amongst us of England's duty, as a Christian nation, to attend the Conference with serious intent. Not a speaker nor paper dare take the matter practically, and say we can afford to reduce our army or navy. We have an army of less than 150,000 men. India, Egypt, and our innumerable African responsibilities require the permanent disposition of a very large proportion of these. It is absurd to talk of reducing it in face of the German standing army of 600,000, the French 600,000, and the Russian 1,000,000. And does anybody seriously think we dare reduce the navy? The papers that now talk of "reduction" emphatically demanded, until a few weeks ago, that we should have, at any price, a naval superiority over France, Germany, and Russia combined. It is very questionable whether we have it to-day. Certainly, the integrity of our scattered empire could not be assured with a smaller proportionate force—and just as certainly Russia and France and Germany would never

consent to remain so far below us. England will cut a sorry figure at a Conference for reduction of armaments—just as embarrassed as America with her new expansive policy. From every point of the political world we are confronted with insuperable obstacles, and one cannot but sympathize with the sudden pensiveness, forgetfulness, and inactivity, of the statesmen to whom the Tsar has forwarded his perplexing message.

CHAPTER III

MILITARISM IN THE ECONOMIC WORLD

THE economic aspect of the problem of disarmament is strangely neglected, or avoided, by the sanguine prophets of the peace movement. There are vague allusions to an economic difficulty, but it dims not the large and enviable hope of the peacemakers. Yet, if M. F. Passy and his associates made a careful analysis of that seeming "inertia" of the nations before their great idea, they would find that industrial hopes and fears are very largely responsible for it. In a commercial age, so intent and so materialistic as ours is, economic interest is one of the gravest factors that can enter into a social or political problem. If such an interest, of a considerable magnitude, is superadded to the obstacles in the way of a solution, one needs the faith of a Tolstoi to raise oneself to a cheerful optimism.

The problem of disarmament is complicated to an alarming extent by economic interests. So

closely is militarism woven into the fabric of the modern industrial world, that its destruction, in the present order of things, would cause a dislocation and a chaos which neither capital nor labour is willing to contemplate. There is a fallacy in acting always on a broad view of the industrial world. Its constituent elements do not take broad views. Practical experience has taught them the stiff, unwieldy character of our economic world, and so they shrink from the theorist who lightly transfers or transforms huge streams of labour or capital—in his own ideas. It is clear that the destruction, or appreciable curtailment, of military activity, would gravely disturb existing economic conditions. Hence, those who are dependent upon and directly interested in the actual order of things hesitate to take the leap into the unknown which would be involved in such an industrial change. That is one serious element in the sentiment of the nations, which governments and prophets do well to examine.

In earlier periods of history war secured no important advantage to any save the ruler and his courtiers. To the nation at large it was a pure economic waste, or it only offered advantages which were inappreciable beside its exhausting strain. Armies followed their leaders under the sullen helplessness of the feudal system, or with

the professional zeal of mercenaries. For the nation at large other sources of interest and consolation had to be relied upon. Human instinct was little advanced in its evolution, and little affected by education: it was not yet "humane" and "humanitarian," but frankly combative and cruel. They had heard of the brotherhood of men (discovered by Confucius, and Buddha, and Christ), but the narrower doctrine of patriotism was more easily assimilated. Then there was the third fierce instinct of victory, which, once the bloody machinery was put in motion, sufficed of itself to carry it through energetically. But there was little thought of profit, beyond a piece of ephemeral and individual plunder. Militarism was only regarded from the economic side as a necessary evil.

These instincts are far from suppressed in the educated peoples of the present day (who could fail to understand the recent scenes in New York and London at the return of the victorious troops?), but they have been reinforced in these latter days by a new power. Had those sentiments alone remained at the root of the popular attachment to militarism, the solution would have been easier. The world is drawing closer together. Material and social science are beginning to press upon the consciousness of humanity that ideal of a vast family or brotherhood which

religion has utterly failed to inculcate. Nations, as Baron Von der Goltz said, have come to resemble personalities. He draws the moral that, therefore, they would rather lose life than honour. But it is permissible to think that, as individuals have come to recognize the expediency of submitting questions of honour to a common tribunal rather than fighting them out, nations, having reached the same stage of unity and self-consciousness, may come at length to a like recognition. The stars have looked down on the cessation, first, of bloody contests of individuals, then of families, then of clans, then of towns. There is only one further step to go.

But a new element has been introduced that threatens to disturb this orderly development of pacific feeling. War has become a science, and it has given birth to enormous industries. The industrial community derives very conspicuous advantages from the military system, and does not clearly see definite compensating advantages in its abolition. So the industrial community, *i. e.* the great body of the nation, does not care to part with militarism just yet. It seems scarcely necessary to give laborious proof of the point, but there are many who do not realize how deeply militarism is rooted in the present industrial order. During the last two centuries England has spent £1,265,000,000 in the con-

duct of her wars, quite independently of the permanent maintenance of her army and navy. France has spent £839,000,000 in the same period in war alone. Russia has spent £335,000,000 in war during the last sixty years. The Anglo-French war from 1793—1815 was the first to make a lively impression on the economic world. It is said by Mulhall to have cost £1,250,000,000; and Mulhall's figures as to the cost of war do not represent their entire commercial "value"; he only gives the distinctly military expenditure. The Crimean war of 1854—1856 cost £305,000,000, or £146,000,000 per year (as compared with £60,000,000 per year in Napoleonic times). The American civil war in 1863—1865, in which nearly 4,000,000 men were engaged, cost £740,000,000 (£350,000,000 per year). The Franco-German war of 1870-71 cost France (including the indemnity to Germany and damage to property, etc.) £506,000,000. The Russo-Turkish war cost £190,000,000; the Chino-Japanese war 225,000,000 dollars; the Hispano-American war cost America alone 250,000,000 dollars. Mulhall's estimate that the principal wars from 1793 to 1877 cost £3,047,000,000 does not represent their full economic value; it does not include indirect consumption. For instance, he estimates the cost of the Franco-German war at £316,000,000. Bodio has shown that it

cost France £506,000,000, and there is still a large margin in Germany not covered by the indemnity.

There has been no great war since 1877. During the last twenty years the arming of the nations has proceeded at an alarming rate. The next great war will infuse a tremendous vitality into our drooping industries. If war breaks out once more between France and Germany, the conflict will be titanic. France would put 3,280,000 men, and Germany 3,350,000 men, fully-armed and equipped, in the field. The process of bleeding each other "as white as veal" will have a most important effect on the industries of the two nations. Naval warfare is fast becoming one of the very finest processes of economic "consumption." A fight between thirty modern battleships would cost about £1,000,000 per hour—not including the ships to be replaced or repaired. A naval war between England, France, and Russia would cost two or three times as much as the purchase of all the land in England—as much as the revenue of England for a whole century.

So much for the economic value of war to the industrial community. To this must be added the ordinary cost of the maintenance of armies and navies in times of peace; fully one-half of this is for direct employment of labour. England

has an annual revenue of about £110,000,000. Of this she spends about £40,000,000 annually on her army and navy, and a further £25,000,000 in the service of the national debt (a war expenditure). Considerably more than half of the entire revenue of the country is absorbed by military expenditure. Russia's latest military budget amounted to 384,379,000 roubles. Germany's military expenditure for the financial year 1896-7 was £31,300,000 out of an entire revenue of £67,000,000. France had a total revenue of £136,900,000 in 1895: of this £25,000,000 were spent on the army, £10,000,000 on the navy, and £35,000,000 in interest on the national debt. Impoverished, starving Italy, out of her forced revenue of £67,000,000, spent £13,000,000 on the army and navy, and £23,000,000 on the national debt. Japan has suddenly dropped into the ways of civilized nations. She has resolved to spend £2,800,000 annually on her army, and to devote £12,000,000 to the improvement of her navy.

And the worst feature—or, rather, the most promising, from our present economic point of view—is that the pace of militarism is accelerating so rapidly. England's naval superiority (which *must* be maintained, even our peace-making journals say) has provoked intense naval

activity all over Europe. The naval estimates of France for 1898 were 285,000,000 francs, of Germany 118,000,000 marks, of Italy 101,000,000 lire, of the United States 31,000,000 dollars (now to be considerably increased). Russia, the peace-maker, has determined to spend 413,000,000 roubles on her navy during the next few years. Japan, with an annual revenue of £15,000,000, has joined in the military race with remarkable ardour, since she felt the substantial advantage of military superiority in the war with China. The United States is entering upon an imperial policy which will revolutionize her military expenditure. Moreover, the dual and the triple alliances seem to be in grave danger of dissolution. The nations would then stand alone, and must increase their expenditure. M. Edmond Théry, writing in the *Économiste Européen*, points out that the military expenditure of the five Powers increased from 2,872,000,000 francs in 1883 to more than 4,000,000,000 in 1895, and asks what it is likely to be when the nations stand singly.

Such is, in the cold language of the statistician, the economic value of modern militarism. The figures are familiar enough. It is not *they* that escape the observation of the preoccupied disarmer. They rank amongst the most powerful of his arguments, since they represent the enormous sum which every tax-payer contributes

annually for his military pageants and contests, and the considerable increase in personal luxury which he sacrifices in retaining militarism. But rarely do we find the other aspect of these statistics commented upon. There are truths, partially realized, which men do not care to unveil and view in their naked proportions. Yet it is obviously wise to appreciate the economic consequences of disarmament before practical measures occupy one's attention. From the general neglect of that aspect of the problem—or the ethereal hopefulness with which it is vaguely postponed—one cannot but infer that its true proportions are very far from being appreciated.

Regarded from this point of view, the above figures show that militarism is deeply rooted in the industrial system of every great nation. When a country devotes half its revenue to military expenses, the productive industries which absorb that sum must be important and extensive. The class or classes that benefit to the extent of £400,000,000 per year in time of war (and the sum increases indefinitely in every decade) will, naturally, remain untouched by the fervid humanitarian appeals of the disarmers. Modern commerce, like political economy, or metaphysics, is jealous of the intrusion of sentiment. The capitalist has found a secure and profitable investment in military industries,

and he has found war to be an excellent method of purifying and relieving periodically a torpid and over-glutted system. With the somewhat vague counsel that he must turn his sword factory into a plough-share factory, you ask him to subscribe to the annihilation of his lucrative industries and his commercial hopes. Money is one of the strongest forces in the modern community, and there is nothing that the moneyed class shrinks from more cautiously than uncertainty of investment. Hence any scheme that involves so widespread a paralysis of the commercial system, and that necessitates a transition from a state of tried and profitable industry to a state of impenetrable confusion, is sure to meet with strong opposition in the moneyed class of every nation. The *bourgeoisie*, very sceptical of the airy speculations of the disarmer (when he *does* condescend to notice this aspect of his problem), will prefer to bear its present and increasing fiscal burden, rather than face the destruction of one-half of its capitalistic combinations and the ensuing chaos, out of which it sees no emergence. Were there a possibility of reducing armaments *gradually*, and thus re-directing the stream of capital in small quantities and at intervals, the scheme might be discussed on its merits. But there is no such possibility. No one dreams of any other than a *pro rata*

reduction. Such a reduction would be utterly useless unless the powers bind themselves not to increase their proportionate strength. And (as we explained above) the man who thinks it possible that the powers which are *de facto* inferior (*e. g.* France, as opposed to Germany) will bind themselves to such a condition, must, indeed, have a supernatural allowance of hope. It is significant that few but ecclesiastics entertain such a hope. It is, therefore, a question of the total abolition of militarism, and the immense interest of capital will be thrown into the scale against it. Only such a government as the Russian, which is entirely independent of the *bourgeoisie*, could have thrown out the suggestion.

And there is a further circumstance, militating even against a gradual reduction, which is too frequently ignored. The consumption of the military system is a barren consumption—unproductive, in one sense of that much-disputed word. Militarism is a luxury of the nation, an implement for the gratification of its vanity and the defence of certain fanciful geographical boundaries. Now, it is entirely in the interest of capital that labour should be unproductive, in this sense. If the mass of energy which capital organizes and sets in motion were directed to work productive of, or conducing to,

the general welfare, the change would be a welcome one to the humanitarian, but would be regarded with much concern by the capitalist. He prefers to see his money invested in battleships, buildings, ordnance, ammunition, etc., which are wealth, or "utilities," in no sense whatever apart from militarism. He knows well that, however large a sum be invested in such unproductive labours, more pressing needs will always keep open the wide field of productive labour for his combinations.

Thus we have one large interest working in the cause of militarism in every country. The *bourgeoisie* was never more powerful, never less sentimental, than it is to-day. One sees its attitude clearly in the "wars of sentiment" with which we are occasionally threatened. The journals reflect, on the whole, the feelings and views of the *bourgeois*. They superabound with Chauvinism when there is friction with any great power; they show a commendable prudence and self-control when they burn over, for instance, the Armenian atrocities. The *bourgeois* are the dread and the anxiety of representative Governments: their stolid, unuttered opposition to the revolutionary scheme of the disarmers will count for much at the Peace Congress. And there is a parallel feeling in the proletariat. Labour dreads industrial chaos as acutely as capital. It is easier

to impress the uneducated proletariat with the simplicity of the process of turning swords into ploughshares than the astute *bourgeois*, yet even the workers have had experience of the transformation of industries. They realize that the military industries count for a very large part in their occupations. You tell them that this same capital must still pass into their pockets in some form or other, but, like the capitalists, they prefer the known to the unknown, even though it imposes sacrifices upon them. They have more reason than the scholarly disarmer to know the complicated nature of our industrial world, and they will not lightly submit to any grave dislocation of its frame.

Besides, there is another feature of the case which gravely disquiets the proletariat. Disarmament (which must be universal or nothing) would not only close immense and very profitable industries; it would cast many millions of additional men on the labour market. At the present day, with our enormous military expenditure, and our absorption of hundreds of thousands of men in the military life, we cannot find employment for a very large section of the workers. Every industry is overglutted; labour has to make most strenuous efforts to maintain its value; there is in every country a colossal army of unemployed. Militarism has relieved

the labour market very considerably by removing a very large proportion of the younger workers every year. The labourer looks grave at the prospect of so serious an interference with the situation. In England our army is not so great as to make this felt acutely, though the prospect of pouring 200,000 additional men, in the prime of life, on the labour world is no light matter for the present strugglers for employment. It is equivalent to the suppression of a great industry for which nothing is to be substituted. However, it is in the lands of national armies that the most serious trouble will arise.

The adult male workers generally form less than one-fifth of an entire population. More than half the population are females; more than half the remainder are under twenty or over sixty. It is amongst these male workers, especially in the earlier years (20—30), that the competition is keenest, and that the moral and material effects of industrial depression are greatest.

It is just that section of the labouring world, already overglutted and in the course of a keen struggle, upon which disarmament would pour its hundreds of thousands of disbanded soldiers. France has a population of 38,000,000: that means less than 8,000,000 adult male workers. The standing army at present keeps 590,000 of the

flower of these out of the struggle for employment, and the reserve army of 2,690,000 men still further relieves the pressure on the industrial world by its occasional demands. The effect of disarmament cannot be a pleasant picture from the point of view of the already despairing *ouvrier*. Germany would also throw nearly 600,000 men on the labour market if she disbanded her army. Austria would contribute 391,000; Italy, 246,000; Turkey, 700,000; Japan, 145,000. Russia would disband more than a million men. In Russia 950,000 young men come to the age of conscription (21) every year. Of these no less than 265,000 are taken off the market and embodied in the army. Each man serves five years with the colours, thirteen in the reserve, and four in the militia. Disarmament would provoke a crisis in the labour world. In Spain we have had an illustration of the economic effect of disarmament. Out of an entire population of 17,000,000 she has had nearly 300,000 (at one time 360,000) with the colours. Already the disbanding of her conquered troops is causing the gravest anxiety. What would have been the effect had not war and disease thinned their ranks so mercilessly?

War is another element in the question. Grim and repulsive as the process is, it is one of the established means of relieving the disastrous

pressure of the labour market (we are taking labour in the widest sense throughout, of course). The Napoleonic war with which the century opened removed 7,500,000 men from competition on the labour market. France alone spent 1,750,000 lives in furthering the ambition of "the *greatest* man that ever lived" (as Lord Wolseley calls him). The Crimean war led to the destruction of 485,000 soldiers. The American civil war removed 656,300 workers. But the number of soldiers killed does not exhaust the economic advantages of war to the labour market. Mulhall says 290,000 men were killed in the Franco-German war: 654,877 is the real "butcher's bill" of the campaign, if we include the soldiers who died of their wounds afterwards, and all persons who died from starvation and other accidents of the war. If we include the number of maimed and crippled and generally disabled from work, we shall have some idea of the beneficial effect of war on the labour market. From the economic point of view, what will be the effect of the next Franco-German war, when 7,000,000 men will wage a *guerre à outrance* with the very finest and most effective instruments of destruction that modern science can produce?

It is clear, then, that disarmament would be a source of very great concern to the workers.

It is but reasonable to think that the pro-military feeling of the masses is due, in some measure, to this consideration. The frivolity with which the difficulty is met sometimes is remarkable. It has been gravely represented to the workers that the £40,000,000 per year which the British taxpayer now spends on the luxury of militarism, will, after disarmament, be spent upon some other luxury, and the disbanded soldiers will thus enter into the newly-created industry. But what becomes of the workers into whose pockets the forty millions went before? Clearly, the sum which is saved by disarmament is only sufficient, even in the text-book of an economist, to capitalize those who were formerly engaged in military industries. You have still this disbanded army of hundreds of thousands of active young men, seeking to share the bread of the already hard-pressed toilers. Clearly the proletariat and the *bourgeoisie* combined will resist industrial revolution.

The airy and trustful manner in which people talk of turning swords into ploughshares makes one think they have slept for a century or two. Those who are actively interested in the industrial order feel only too acutely the absurdity of repeating a formula which is hopelessly anachronistic. It is a gross fallacy to urge it as a symbol of the process of converting the

energy which is expended on warfare into peaceable channels. The difficulty lies precisely in the intricacy and the isolation of modern industries. In theory, the process seems to be simplicity itself. Capital and labour are pitilessly squandered on militarism. Let the nations agree to reject that pernicious luxury, and they will have the same money to spend on commodities which increase the happiness of life rather than prolong its primeval cruelty and misery. New industries must arise to meet the new demand—which will be, intensively and extensively, just equal to the old one. Capital and labour have merely to change their field of action, and they will find just as much employment as formerly.

But it is idle to think that industrial changes of so formidable a character can be effected with so little difficulty. Fashions change and create a demand for new luxuries. New industries immediately spring into existence to provide them. But such operations are trivial in comparison with the vast upheaval which would ensue on the suppression of military industries. Indeed, we have in many instances of this character a striking illustration of the gravity of even these minor transformations of industries. The industrial history of Macclesfield eloquently points out the rigid and unwieldy nature of our industrial system. If we had to face the

suppression, not of one minor industry (like the silk industry), but of the vast branches of commerce and manufacture which lie at the base of militarism, we should have that pitiful story of years of impotence and suffering multiplied a thousand fold in every civilized nation.

It must be borne in mind, too, that the money which was saved from military expenditure would not immediately flow into a new channel of re-distribution. Military budgets being suppressed, the people would refuse to pay the taxes which were formerly exacted from them. This money would remain in the hands of the people—that is, in virtue of a conspicuous feature of our economic system, the tendency of money to accumulate in a few hands (and the tendency would be more accentuated in a state of economic chaos), it would pass largely into the hands of a capitalistic oligarchy. The gulf between capital and labour would widen still further. At the present day the State ensures the circulation and more equitable distribution of this money in appropriating it and applying it to military works. Moreover, the state of panic and the abstention of capital would probably be increased by trouble over the national debts. Would nations continue to pay the interest on the war-debts of their forefathers? Some of the

debts have been more than repaid already in the form of interest. In the general insecurity and confusion the rate of interest would be likely to rise considerably.

No doubt, eventually, money which had been saved from military expenditure would find new channels of re-distribution. But it would be after years of struggle and pauperism, and industrial anarchy. In the case of individual workers the change of industry is enormously difficult to-day. The division of labour has been carried so far that each man has become a mere part of a machine, and his sphere of action is extremely limited. Years are spent in giving him a technical education which becomes utterly useless on the suppression of his particular branch of industry. Moreover, our industries are so complicated in action, so far from forming a system, that no man could predict the re-distribution of capital and energy, and, certainly, no power can direct it. The day has long since disappeared when the community could direct the production of the commodities it desired, and transfer one section of its toilers and its wealth to a new object, according to its taste or political circumstances. The community has reached that higher stage of economic development, in which production and distribution have passed beyond its control so completely, that any change of its

tastes or customs involves a painful confusion and much suffering; in which it is possible for a million strong men to be utterly incapable of earning their own living; in which the mass of the people long for a higher standard of individual comfort, are prepared to expend time and energy enough to create and diffuse that higher stage of comfort, and yet are condemned by the iron laws of the "system" to spend half their days, or leave half their number, in an exasperating idleness. Under such a "system" of industry, no man can predict the final outcome of such a revolution as the disarmers advocate. In that uncertainty, and in the consciousness of their utter helplessness to re-organize their own activities, neither capital nor labour will care to face disarmament. In a more primitive community the difficulty would not arise. The simplicity of the arrangements would make it possible to carry out the pretty theory of the economist—viz. that the community, receiving an accession of toilers (through the cessation of war), could either reduce its hours of labour or increase its standard of comfort. But we have advanced far beyond that stage of economics in civilized Europe. We have lost all control of the conditions of industrial life, and are utterly incapable of incorporating into our "system" and utilizing, for their own and the general welfare,

an accession of half-a-million pairs of willing and powerful hands.

We may conclude, then, that this economic difficulty, or fear of an economic difficulty, is an important factor in the pro-military spirit of the nations. Taken in conjunction with the political difficulties we enumerated, and the emotional elements which still foster the combative tendency, it forms an obstacle to disarmament, at the present stage of the world, which philanthropists and rulers will find it impossible to overcome. We are confronted with a curious paradox and a pitiful spectacle. Nations squander half their energy and wealth upon a system which brings them nothing but trepidation, suffering, and impoverishment. They are beginning, at last, to recognize the hideous brutality of war. Yet by the very conditions of industrial life which they energetically defend, they find themselves unable to shake off the oppressive incubus. They must continue to maintain armies and navies which are a constant provocation of a most agonizing struggle; they must, even, look forward to that struggle itself, so degrading, so fraught with misery, to further their commercial interests. It is an eloquent commentary on our economic progress in this "wonderful century."

CHAPTER IV

THE ARMY IN FRANCE

In the condition of things which has been described in the preceding chapter, the thoughts of many naturally turn to the possibility of revolution. When the human mind does finally persuade itself of the existence of deep grievances, it is apt to embrace the most violent and revolutionary remedies, in compensation of its long lethargy. The pitiful spectacle of a nation sustaining the crushing military system, and living constantly on the verge of a most hideous war, is well calculated to inspire such sentiments. Those who think that there is reason to take the hypothesis of a revolutionary solution seriously, seem to consider that it will find its source and its strength in the great national armies of Europe. Should any event occasion the mobilization of the great national army in its full strength, the mass of the people, finding itself clothed with an irresistible power, and always

largely in antagonism with the ruling class, might not improbably undertake the reconstitution of society. Now, France is one of the countries in which this danger most clearly exists, hence it will be interesting to study the constitution, organization, and influence of the army in France, and see whether it bears the germs of such a social transformation as would facilitate disarmament.

As we explained above, it was after the war of '70 and the Commune that France organized its active army with three great lines of reserve.[1] Previous to that date, the army had been composed of an active permanent army with only the National Guard as reserve. The National Guards kept their weapons at home, and elected their own officers. So purely democratic an institution was a standing menace to the ruling bureaucracy, and, in point of fact, many of the Guards had taken the revolutionary side in '48 and '71. After the fall of the

[1] The approximate figures at the present day are—

13 classes of the active army and reserve (deduction of about 1 per cent.) . .	1,900,000
6 classes of the territorial army (deduction of about 20 per cent.)	740,000
6 classes of reserve of territorial army (deduction of about 33 per cent.) . . .	550,000
Officers and non-commissioned officers .	90,000
Effective total on war footing . .	3,280,000

Commune, therefore, the Government suppressed the National Guard, made military service obligatory for all, and practically organized the army, at least on paper, on its actual footing. In name, at least, the army had changed from pretorian to national; it was impossible, theoretically, to dissociate the active army from its three lines of reserve, which should fight with it in case of war. In reality, the active army was regarded by the commanders, from the very beginning, as *the* army—a pretorian army, more numerous than formerly. This distinction would fall through at once in case of a war mobilization. The chiefs would find themselves, for the first time, in face of a real national army *une nation armée*, with sentiments probably opposed to their own, and an irresistible power to enforce them. The active pretorian army of the times of peace would be merged in the immense reserves, and might present a new character. It would be the revelation of a social force, a possible factor in the problem, which is as yet a formidable unknown quantity.

For the present, however, the active army has always been considered by the military chiefs as a pretorian army, whose character was little affected by the calling up of the reserves at lengthy intervals, and which they could easily manipulate for preserving the internal peace of

the State. The most rigorous measures were taken to maintain this character. A military code of Draconian severity was elaborated, and an iron discipline imposed. This discipline was enforced all the more pitilessly, as the generals, the losers and the *capitulards* of '70, were only too ready to avenge themselves on their new troops. Moreover, it was not only on the privates that they relieved their feelings. A certain number of French officers had distinguished themselves in the war, and had been promoted on the field of battle. When the generals returned from their imprisonment in Germany, they instituted a *Commission de Révision des Grades*, and almost nullified the promotions which had been made during their "absence."

Moreover, in order to preclude any understanding between the people and the army, they abolished the recruiting and garrisoning of soldiers in their own provinces. Recruits for the active service were sent as far as possible from their homes; recruits from Marseilles to Dunkirk, from Lyons to Bordeaux. The garrison at Paris was recruited almost entirely from Corsica and Lower Brittany. The reserves were scattered in a similar fashion. This measure holds good to-day in France. It is an excellent arrangement in the event of an insurrection; it is per-

nicious and detestable from the military point of view. In consequence of it, as we shall see, the French army could not be mobilized for at least five or six days after the mobilization of the German army, which retains district-recruiting. At the same time, the officers were drawn from the families of the aristocracy and the rich *bourgeoisie* through the school of Saint Cyr, to which they were attracted by the easiness of the examinations. For the reserve, officers were drawn from "*Voluntaires d'un an*"—young *bourgeois* who paid 1500 francs to the State, and then served one year instead of five. At the end of the year they were appointed non-commissioned officers, and shortly afterwards officers. Latterly, however, with the reduction of the period of active service from five years to three, and under the pressure of public opinion, this arrangement has been suppressed, and certain facilities have been offered to those who rise from the ranks to win the epaulette.

In spite of all reforms, however, the command is still almost entirely in the hands of the privileged classes, the aristocracy and the *haute bourgeoisie*. This is especially true since the laws of 1881, expelling non-authorized religious congregations, have become a dead letter. The religious schools and colleges (kept by Jesuits, Dominicans, etc.) make a special feature of preparing

pupils for the army; by the adroit use of their influence they secure good places for their pupils, and a rapid advancement. It is almost impossible for those who rise from the ranks, and even for those who come from non-clerical establishments, to compete with the pupils of the *Bons Pères*. In fact, those who have neither money nor clerical influence are entirely discouraged from the military career. Subaltern officers are very badly paid. A lieutenant receives, on an average, about £8 per month. It is almost impossible to meet the expenses of life in France with that sum. The pupils of the religious schools are much more fortunate. If a young man has no fortune, the good fathers arrange a rich marriage for him as soon as he gets his epaulette. The Jesuits and Dominicans could give lessons to Belgravian mammas in match-making. A leading English review declared recently that, "at present, the entire War Ministry, the whole General Staff, two-thirds of the cavalry officers, and about one-half of all the other officers, are pupils of the Jesuit fathers, and devout children of the Church." On the other hand, a French military writer, M. Urbain Gohier, has proved that amongst the actual officers are to be found all the aristocratic names which were borne at the Revolution by the *émigrés* who fought against France in the army of Condé.

It is clear, then, that the command of the active army—the only army visible in time of peace—is in the hands of a military caste, which guards its hierarchic privileges most jealously. It is a caste that is instinctively opposed to democratic principles and republican ideas, and will make every effort to maintain its position. The privileges of this ruling class are threatened from the bosom of the army itself, from which its position and despotism might be assailed, and also by the encroachments, or by any control, of the Civil Power. Against these two dangers it fortifies itself, respectively, by its discipline and its organization.

The discipline of the French army is the most severe in existence. The yoke that burdens her soldiers is far heavier than it ever was in the pretorian armies. The slightest faults are most severely punished, and the punishments are always corporal—restriction of food, exhausting burdens, sleep in hideous cells on a bare board, etc. These punishments, moreover, which are the daily lot of the soldier, ascend "the hierarchic scale." If a man has been condemned by a non-com. to four days of prison for returning five minutes late to the barracks, he often finds it changed—(1) to eight days in the police-room, by the captain; (2) to eight days in prison, by the major; (3) to fifteen days in prison, by the

colonel; (4) to thirty days in prison, by the general of the brigade; (5) to sixty days in prison, by the general of division. The general commanding the army corps generally contributes a modest fifteen days in prison. As soon as a man has incurred one hundred and twenty days in prison (he need not do anything very distinguished to obtain it), he is considered to be dangerous on account of his bad example. He is at once sent, without a decision of a court-martial, to *Biribi*—the military slang for the *Compagnies de Discipline* in Africa, principally in the south of Tunis (whither Colonel Picquart was recently sent by those who desired to get rid of him). In a climate which is extremely dangerous, the *disciplinaires* are treated with a barbarity which was scarcely surpassed by the Inquisition. The vivid picture which has been drawn, in M. Darien's *Biribi*, of their sufferings and privations, and of the baseness and brutality of their officers, is beyond imagination. Here is an example of military discipline in modern times (remember that the majority of French officers are "devout children of the Church")—

"On y (*i. e.* in a hole dug in the ground) avait mis un type auquel on avait attaché les mains derrière le dos. Il y est resté près de quinze jours. A midi et le soir on lui jetait, comme

d'habitude, son bidon d'eau qui se vidait en route et son quart de pain qu'il attrappait comme il pouvait. Je me souviens que pendant les cinq au six derniers jours, il criait constamment pour qu'on le fit sortir. Enfin, quand on l'a retiré, il était à moitié mangé par les vers . . . ayant les mains attachées derrière le dos, il ne pouvait pas se déculotter. A force, les excréments ont engendré des vers, et les vers se sont mis à lui manger la chair . . . il est mort huit jours après."

It is useless to multiply instances. The barbarity and ferocity of the treatment is inconceivable. Forty per cent. of them do not survive it. Men with extreme opinions are sent there the day they come to the regiment, without having committed any fault whatever. There are constantly about 8000 men in *Biribi*.

Revolting as this picture is, it only applies to soldiers who have transgressed certain minor rules, not to those who have infringed the graver regulations of the Code Militaire. Those who are so unfortunate as to do this pass before a court-martial, and are treated with appalling severity. To call a corporal, for instance, a "silly clown," is sufficient to draw upon a soldier the sentence of death. In such cases the sentence is often commuted into ten or twenty years' hard labour; but it is frequently executed. It is not

long since the English Press echoed the indignation which arose in France on account of the frightful number of military executions. If the Code Militaire were published in England, it would arouse popular indignation to a high pitch. It is infamous. As to the courts-martial which apply it, they are unworthy of the name. They are permanent "Bloody Assizes." The accusation is an hypocrisy; the defence is a deplorable farce; the debates would be irresistibly humorous —if we could shut out their tragic consequence. The military "judges" dispose annually of the liberty, the life, and the honour of thousands of citizens. They condemn hundreds to death every year, and they people with a crowd of desperate wretches the prisons of Africa, the Pénitenciers, and the Ateliers de Travaux Publics.

It is idle to suppose that this horrible system is necessary for the proper discipline of the army. The voice of a number of officers of liberal views is raised in opposition to it; common-sense and the experience of other nations (compare our British Fleet, for instance) declare its futility in that respect. This stupid and odious discipline is simply used in order to emphasize the power of the military oligarchy, to make the citizen realize, during his passage through the army, the severity of the military executive, and to inspire him with a salutary dread of it for the rest of

his days; to enable the clerico-reactionary chiefs to hold well in hand, as a weapon, that part of the national army which they have continued to use as a pretorian army; to crush out any hope of insurrection against their odious tyranny, and to prove to liberal-minded officers that they would have no followers in case of a *coup*. One has only to recall recent events to realize the system of espionage and persecution to which these liberal and republican officers are subjected.

Passing to the organization of the army, we find that it has been the constant pre-occupation of the military caste to withdraw its actions from the control of the Civil Power. With this intention, cleverly taking advantage of that dread of a dictatorship which haunts the Civil Power, it has carefully abstained from putting an effective supreme commander at the head of the army. Such a commander-in-chief would have been a responsible person: it is the interest of the army that no person should be responsible or liable to be summoned to render an account. It is true that the French army has a *généralissime* appointed in the event of war. General Jamont holds that position at the present day. But the powers of this commander-in-chief cannot be exercised until a declaration of war has taken place. Until then the position is merely honorary. He can come to no decision: he does not even

know, except on paper, the troops he will have to command. Hence it cannot be said that there is a supreme command in the French army; for it is substituted an extraordinary administrative centralization, which is perfectly anonymous and absolutely irresponsible. The army seems to be organized only in view of a time of peace—that is, in reality, in view of *internal action*—not at all for the active life of war. It is not *commanded:* it is simply *administered.* The army corps, located in their territorial divisions and departments, seem to lead a separate individual existence. Their commanders, who are united by no common influence (except the interest of caste), and whose omnipotence is uncontrolled by any higher power, act each according to his own sweet will. Contact with the common centre at Paris, the War Offices, is only established by correspondence, whose invading flood completely dwarfs the notorious correspondence of our own War Office. More than two million francs are spent annually on registers, printing, and stationery.

As for the Minister of War, who caps the military edifice, his power is chimerical. Unstable, uncertain of the morrow, pre-occupied with political considerations, spending one-half of his time in providing senseless replies to stupid interpellations, the other half in preparing men-

dacious estimates which are to get as much money as possible from Parliament and give as little account of it as possible, he lives from day to day powerless to do anything useful. He has scarcely time to undo the little which his predecessor did, and he knows well his successor will re-establish it, and his successor's successor destroy it. The Minister of War is a puppet, a lay figure. With him is associated the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre, composed of ten members : it was created by *decrees* in '88 and '93, and has, therefore, no *legal* existence. It is charged with the examination of questions relating to preparation for war. It is as often neglected as consulted; its directions are not always transmitted to those whom they concern, and they have no real sanction. To complete the paradox, it is entrusted with the direction of the mobilization, and the plan of operations. Thus it becomes, instead of the *consultative* body which it ought to be, an *executive* organ which it ought not to be. In reality, it accomplishes nothing.

The truth is, that it is the État-Major Général which is at the head of the military administration. Its chief (who is *de jure* permanent Rapporteur) and sub-chief form part of the Superior Council of War. Much has been said of this État-Major during the last five months, and its principal functions are pretty well known.

We need only add that it has no secondary functions. The reactionary, infantile, and abject manœuvres which it has been engaged in lately, in co-operation with the clericals, take up all its time. It is with such proceedings which we have seen it employ that it directs the whole central military administration. There are those who maintain that the less reputable of its methods have not yet seen the light. It is useless, too, to treat of the Comités Techniques—of infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc.—which take up questions relating to each branch of the service. Their real function is to foster an *esprit de corps*, and the mutual jealousy of the different services.

It follows that there is really no supreme command in the French army, and that anonymity rules in its administration. The greatest scandals may arise, the most criminal negligence may be discovered, the thefts of purveyors may run on uninterrupted: nobody is responsible. Indeed, the French Chambers have not the courage to claim control if they wished; they are too ignorant to maintain it effectively if it were feasible. They have not light enough to carry out their researches in the dark caverns of military administration; and Colonel Du Paty de Clam would certainly not lend them his dark-lantern. People say that the Chambers depend upon the country: they depend more upon Leo XIII. If the country

does count for anything in their existence, it must be remembered that the French are rarely enlightened even by the most terrible lessons. They acquire no experience.

But if the French nation does not gather wisdom from its terrible experiences, it must be said, at least, that it is sometimes disillusioned. Now one of the illusions which is fading from the mind of a large number of the people is, that the transformation of that part of the national army which is the active army into a pretorian army, governed by terror, administered by anonymity, and manifestly awaiting its Cæsar, is necessary for the national defence. National defence is a matter of vital importance, it is true, and may necessitate many things. But, at the same time, it is necessary that the people who have this word ever on their lips should give some proof of the activity and ability with which they prepare that defence. These proofs are not given in vague, complacent assurances, brought to the Tribune by a Minister of War; still less by the theatrical indignation of a Pontiff of the État-Major declaring, in the teeth of a dozen terrified jurymen, that he will hand in his resignation. They can only be given by facts. Unfortunately, the facts do not tell in favour of the supreme command which is represented by the État-Major. Take the colonial expeditions. The expedition to

Tunis—not a large undertaking—was deplorably prepared. Half the regiments were disorganized to furnish the expeditionary body of men, arms, and horses; the commissariat and the medical service were abominable. Then came the expedition to Tongking, which was managed rather worse. The details are not unknown to English readers. But it is especially in the expedition to Madagascar that the État-Major (which obtained special powers for the work) gave clearest proof of its improvidence, inexperience, and incapacity. The English Press fully acquainted its readers with the details of this campaign: it did not exaggerate. Probably no military administration ever gave so sad a proof of ignorance and carelessness, from every point of view. The campaign only consisted of a few miniature skirmishes—yet 8000 French soldiers left their bones on the island. Nobody was held responsible for the criminal errors which cost the lives of so many soldiers. It is painful. But it is still more painful to think that the men who prepared these expeditions will conduct the defence of the frontiers, in case of an attack upon France itself. What has this État-Major, which speaks so much and so fervently of "national defence," done to safeguard it? Let us see.

In case of a war with Germany—the only

probable outlook for the army—the army must be mobilized as rapidly as possible. It is admitted in French military circles that no plan of mobilization has been elaborated. There are vague unpractical projects, but no exact and detailed plan. It is true that General de Miribel elaborated a plan which was highly thought of, especially by those who knew least about mobilization. Certainly, it was a most conscientious effort. But, whatever may have been its value, de Miribel died in 1893, and three years afterwards a most important change in the German army rendered the plan utterly useless. In May 1896, the German army, by a clever and inexpensive change, added to its infantry more men than the entire infantry of the British army. One needs much faith to suppose that General de Boisdeffre has elaborated a new plan. He could not do it—even with the help of a whole staff of "veiled ladies"—for this simple reason: a rapid mobilization of the French army is impossible. The suppression of district-recruiting, which compels reserve men to go from one end of France to the other to rejoin their corps, and the congestion of the railways which would result, quite prevent a rapidity of mobilization. In addition, much time would be lost in equipping and arming the men, for they are not allowed to keep their paraphernalia at home. Moreover, it

has been proved that the railway companies could not meet the exigencies of mobilization; a recent trial with the 17th Army Corps (Toulouse) has quite established it. The Compagnie de l'Est, the most important, from the military point of view, would be particularly helpless. It would be obliged, as it was in '70, to block its engines on the Lyons lines, from the very beginning of operations—that is, from the taking of Nancy by the Germans.

That Nancy would be taken immediately nobody can doubt. It is utterly unprotected. It has been repeatedly asked why Nancy was unfortified (it would be easy to fortify it), and the État-Major has made vague replies —even going so far, on one occasion, as to say that the town remained open "parcequ'il était nécessaire de canaliser l'invasion"! It is well known to-day that Nancy is unfortified because one of the secret clauses of the Treaty of Frankfort forbids its fortification. Hence the topographical military position of France is deplorable. The possession of Metz by the Germans, protected in the rear by the impregnable defence of the forests of Haguenau and Strassburg, forbids all hope of invading Germany by the "trouée des Vosges." The French must remain on the defensive; and, Nancy being an open town, they must evacuate it, almost without

a struggle, to retrench themselves behind their fortified line of Verdun-Toul-Epinal.

The Germans, on the other hand, will find it easy to take the offensive. Nancy, only about twelve miles from the frontier, and unfortified, could be invested three-quarters of an hour after the declaration of war, and would offer, in conjunction with Metz, a splendid basis of operations against the French line. The Germans would then be firmly established in a corner of French territory. It must be remembered that, thanks to her system of district-recruiting (which reactionary political considerations have kept out of France), Germany can mobilize her army, certainly five or six, probably fifteen days before France. It is not clear that the French fortified line could cover, during this time, not only the operations of mobilization, but also what remains of Lorraine, Champagne, and Franche-Comté. The forts which compose this line have not a very high value; they are frequently repaired, but they are built on an obsolete system. The new projectiles, thrown by new mortars, gravely endanger their situation. Naturally, the French also have the new projectiles, but they are mainly useful in attack, and it is not the French who will attack. German officers boast that they will enter Nancy, like a mill, after the declaration of war, and find the

beds of the French officers still warm: they do not exaggerate much. They say, also, that the French line will be forced forty-eight hours after their entrance into Nancy; in this they probably exaggerate a little. In any case, once the French line is forced, the road is open to Paris on one hand, and to Lyons on the other. Communication by the most important railways will be broken off. Moreover, Germany, with her superb topographical position and rapidity of mobilization, could attack France in other points at the same time; she might try, for instance, her plan of landing an army on the coast of Normandy.

Hence, in the event of a new Franco-German war, France would find her greatest difficulties at the outset. She would be forced to retire, would be invaded, and might not be able to check the flood of the invasion until it had submerged several provinces. What have the heads of the État-Major done, not to avert an invasion, which is impossible, but to meet it effectually? Practically nothing. For political reasons they have rejected district-recruiting; the Chambers would have voted it at once, if it were desired. They did not intervene to point out the helplessness of the railway companies, from the military point of view, when the Chambers concluded with them what are known as the "Conventions

scélérates." They have left the different branches of the service in the same state of disorder as in 1870. They have not maintained the fortifications up to the level of recent inventions. After their conspicuous failure in conducting colonial expeditions, one could scarcely expect them to grapple firmly with the problem of a European war.

There is the same disorder, carelessness, and criminal extravagance in the navy. In fact, the clerical-reactionary spirit has been even more conspicuous in the navy. Republican naval officers have protested, in a body, against the "Jesuitical" and reactionary tendencies of the higher command: army officers have not yet been driven to that. The fleet, which has cost £210,000,000 since 1870, is "a huge network of cumbrous uselessness." Enormous sums have been spent on national defence. The people bend under the burden of taxes, and they know that a large proportion of the money they have sacrificed has been shamefully squandered. And the only preoccupation of the men whose mission it was to guard the security of France, has been to form a pretorian army which they hold in check by terror—a pretorian army which exists independently of all control, in which the most odious tyranny prospers, in which every democratic ideal is trodden under foot, and which they

mean to employ for the triumph of their ideas—ideas which give a nation a choice between a tyrant's prison and a priest's confessional—even over the corpse of their country.

It is a mistake to think that a large section of the French public is not alive to the facts we have enumerated. The mistake is common outside of France: thanks, in a great measure, to the manner in which the foreign Press (including the English) has treated the Dreyfus question. With the best intentions in the world, the Press only succeeds in giving a very incorrect version of things French: partly because it does not understand the moral condition of France, partly because it reads the French papers—which do *not* reflect the sentiments of the nation. The Press gives one the impression that the French people is divided to-day into two great classes—the Dreyfusards and the anti-Dreyfusards, the partisans of the civil power, and those of the military power. In point of fact, these two classes only constitute a minority of the people: there is an enormous proportion who do not enter into either category. It is true that these are not the people whose sentiments a foreign Press usually seeks. They have only one function—to produce, by their physical and intellectual labour, the strength and wealth of the nation. Since they receive only a minimum of this

wealth, and since the strength they forge usually turns against them, they are of little account. Still, they are men: one day, perhaps, their opinion will have to be taken into account. For the moment, we confine ourselves to the Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards.

The latter are the partisans of the military power. The category contains, first of all, military men, represented most brilliantly by the pontiffs of the État-Major. Then comes a crowd of clericals and reactionaries of every shade who trust to find, in the accumulation of scandals, some cause for the overthrow of the Republic. Then there is a small number of silly politicians, who are in good faith—like Déroulède: and a much larger number of the same species who are not in good faith—like Drumont and Rochefort. A good number of students, especially of law, and officials of all kinds: Jingoism, pure and unconscious, always thrives best in the regions of red tape. Finally a group of small capitalists, small proprietors and *rentiers*, who are called out at the least crisis, who cling devotedly to the power which they believe the stronger, and whose nervousness is a constant indication of the frail and fluctuating character of their capital. If we add the multitude of journalists and agitators who are dependent on the military interest, and the people who trust to get the

berths they aspire to by a change of *régime*, we have a fairly complete inventory of the Dreyfusard group.

On the other side we have the partisans of the supremacy of the civil power: men who are imbued with those firm and temperate democratic principles which have shone so brilliantly under the third republic: men who have a holy horror of iniquity: who claim respect for the Law, against and above all, and desire its equitable application to all: men who are upright and virtuous, who rise in indignation against the sudden pretensions of a military party whose very existence was unknown to them yesterday, who find themselves confronted with a situation which no human being could have foreseen, and who are prepared to struggle to the end, as is their wont, against all abuses and injustices. All this they do out of pure love of Truth and Equity: consideration of the positions they hold is beneath them. They have the safety of the Republic at heart, like Cicero of old. Men *sans peur et sans reproche* are at their head, the Bayards of the democracy—MM. Joseph Reinach, Yves Guyot, de Pressensé, etc.

M. Zola has been applauded for saying that nothing will prevent the unfolding of the truth. The truth has already dawned in the minds of the majority whom we mentioned above, and

who belong to neither group in the controversy. At least they see what they consider to be the truth—for they are only the proletariat, and they have not the superior intelligence of the higher classes. Still, their opinion is interesting; perhaps important. About Dreyfus himself they do not trouble themselves much. They do not forget (which is so frequently forgotten elsewhere) that the abject manœuvres of the État-Major have been in vogue for twenty-seven years at least: that Dreyfus had been an accomplice of these tactics, before he became their victim: that snares have been set, in every regiment, for the men who were obnoxious to head-quarters: that his trial has not been more irregular than that of nearly every man who is taken before the courts-martial: that Captain Dreyfus, sitting on a court-martial, would not have exacted more proof against the accused than was given against himself: that if his lot is hard in the Ile du Diable, especially if he is innocent, it is no worse than that of thousands of soldiers, many equally guiltless, who are rotting in the prisons of Africa: and that, if a miscarriage of justice has taken place, it must, indeed, be repaired—but only on condition that all the countless iniquities of military justice be redeemed at the same time, and that a system which authorizes so much injustice (which the rich

incur so rarely and the poor so often) be swept away for ever.

Their opinion of the partisans of the supremacy of the military power is—that they are reactionaries and clericals, pitilessly selfish, stupid, and cruel. They have not lost the memory of the terrible repression of the Commune, when the corpses of 35,000 workmen were scattered over the streets of Paris. As to the partisans of the supremacy of the civil power, they are not sure that these merit all the eulogies they have received from abroad. They have grave doubts of the sincerity of their democratic convictions, and notice that they have carefully avoided every opportunity of putting them in practice. They fear that it is these men who have made France what she is to-day—the laughing-stock of Europe—a sort of monarchy ashamed to acknowledge itself, with a very inglorious hero at its head, and bent in reverence before a Cossack with a notoriety for whipping women. They think that their rule has been harder for the poor than even imperial rule, a rule stained with innumerable financial and political scandals, a rule of favouritism and a triumph of mediocrities.

"These men," says the proletariat, "who preach Virtue and Truth, have procured most iniquitous sentences from their magistrates when

it served their purpose. They have used the Law as an instrument to further their selfish policy. They rise to-day against the military tribunals! What have they done themselves with the civil tribunals? What have they done with the institution of trial by jury? It has almost disappeared, and given place to correctional tribunals which are docile instruments in the hands of the civil power. A magistrate, M. Jean Cruppi, has shown, in his *La Cour d'Assises*, that the cases submitted to juries are less every year. In 1891 only 2900 cases were settled by a jury, whilst the correctional tribunals judged 195,000, and the total number of cases was 500,000. This substitution of the Tribunal Correctionel for the Cour d'Assises is entirely against the law, and it is precisely the work of the men who pose to-day as the apostles of legality. Then there are the many important laws—as the laws relating to piece-work, and those expelling the religious congregations—which remain unenforced through class or political interests. As to the military power, it is childish to say that its pretensions have come to the surface suddenly in these latter days; they have been obvious since the creation of the republic, and the civil power has done nothing to counteract them. The civil power has allowed the army, which should be the free and living

strength of the nation, to be oppressed and enslaved by a military oligarchy which has never disguised its reactionary tendencies. The civil power has grossly neglected its duty of watching and controlling the army; it has closed its eyes to the way in which the War Office squandered the money and the blood of France—so long as it could count upon the 'loyalty' of the military command, *i. e.* its co-operation in defence of class interests. It has itself created the situation of to-day. It has only risen against the military power, when the latter showed signs of a wish to attack the republican form of government and thus endangered its personal interest—for if the military power has 500,000 men under its orders, the civil power has 600,000 officials, who form an immense electoral agency for France and the colonies. They numbered only 200,000 under the Empire. It is nothing but a question of personal interest. In the Panama business, was not M. Joseph Reinach the relative and friend of the Baron de Reinach who only escaped prison by suicide? Was not M. Yves Guyot, the Minister of Public Works who allotted himself 500 francs per day at each of his movements, in friendly relation with the same baron? Is not M. de Pressensé one of the heads of a journal, *Le Temps*, which received a subsidy of 1,600,000 francs? It looks very much as if this rivalry

between the civil and military powers were only a struggle between two branches of the same power, whose harmonious working would only injure the proletariat, and whose dissension, therefore, must be regarded with satisfaction, if not with pleasure."

Such are the feelings of the French proletariat. Such was the spirit of the 50,000 workmen who went on strike at Paris, at the height of the Dreyfus fever, and resumed work, with perfect indifference to the controversy which was burning the boulevards. The proletariat would seem to think that, by the side of the modern representative and parliamentary system which legislates, it is really the old system of government "by permanent army and civil administration," instituted (on the continent) by Charles V., which rules over them. It seems to feel that the representative system is a myth, and could do nothing, if it would, for the "disinherited." It is only natural to suppose that it goes a step further, and thinks there is no hope of a change of political and economic conditions unless it sets up a new form of government more in harmony with its aspirations. Contrary to the old socialistic teaching, they have no faith in parliamentary representation; they favour a kind of revolutionary socialism. Now, if this be a correct appreciation of the mind of the proletariat,

it is interesting to see how far this new direction has been determined by the creation of national armies, and whether, when the people finds itself in possession of one of the great wheels of the State—by its bodily enrolment in the army, after a declaration of war—it may not proceed to demolish the other wheel, and effect the social changes which must prepare the way for disarmament.

The influence of the institution of national armies on the general spirit of nations is extremely dangerous, from the conservative point of view. M. Delafosse, who cannot be suspected of subversive tendencies, recently said in the Chamber—"I consider obligatory military service, as it exists amongst us, as the worst agent of social disintegration and national dissolution. I am convinced that, if we permit it to continue the ravages which it has already begun to produce, in twenty years there will be no more society, no more army, nothing but the dust of a people, without bond or cohesion. . . . From a social point of view, the effects produced by obligatory military service, as we know it, are infinitely perilous to the future of society. It produces a rupture of equilibrium which is one of the great dangers of the present hour, and I consider obligatory military service as one of the most powerful agents of revolutionary socialism."

The fact is, that military service often produces effects quite the opposite of what one would expect. The slavery which it imposes, aggravated by a terrible discipline, produces or develops aspirations towards liberty. It does not teach the spirit of discipline and obedience—it destroys it. It has brought in its train the enforcement of education—an ignorant man cannot be a good soldier to-day. Transporting young men from one part of the country to the other (especially on the French system) opens their minds, and breaks the force of their village superstitions. It attracts the male youth of the country to the towns; they never return to their villages; female youth follows them. One soon notices the absence of men from twenty to forty in the country in France, except the small proprietors. The daily contact of barrack life increases class feeling, and unites the proletariat of town and country in a common jealousy. The military service gives them a disgust for bestial mechanical work, and forces them to compare the slavery they endure with the slavery of civil life; they conclude that the two spring from the same source. The constant use of arms must drive them to think, in their exasperation, that brute force is the only way of salvation. Socialism is actively propagated amongst them. Young men of education and ability are brought

in by the compulsory service, who take the first opportunity to express their hatred and disgust of the epauletted despotism. A great number of books have been written by them, and their wide circulation has spread hostility to the military aristocracy; for instance, *Au port d'armes*, by Henri Fèvre; *Le Cavalier Miserey*, by Abel Hermant; *Sous-offs*, by Lucien Descaves, and *Biribi*, by Georges Darien.

The creation of national armies, then, has clearly given the proletariat an impetus towards revolutionary socialism, and opened out a new speculation as to their function. The mission of the great national armies seems obscure to the few favourites of fortune who take the trouble to reflect upon it; to the "disinherited" it is luminously clear. For the latter it means a full development of their democratic ideal, an equalization of rights and duties, a suppression of the old system of governing by army and administration, a replacement of hostile states by voluntarily federated groups. They do not accept the dictum of Joseph de Maistre: "Man is too wicked to be free." Rightly or wrongly, they say the army must become an instrument of liberation, not of despotism. The same change is taking place to-day in the mind of the proletariat with regard to the army which took place in the mind of the worker with regard to the

machine. The machine was declared pernicious, at the beginning of the century, and broken in pieces. Gradually the workers realized that the benefits it produced, if denied to themselves at present, would end in becoming general. A similar change of view has taken place with regard to the army. Hence it is that, just as a worker would oppose the destruction of machinery on the plea that it would give a chance to the unemployed, so he would oppose the reduction of national armies into pretorian on the plea that it would lighten taxation.

But the proletariat knows perfectly well that national armies do not exist to-day except on paper. One part of it, the active army, has a real existence, but it is dominated by a ruthless oligarchy in harmony with the general organization of society. The supremacy of the military power is exactly like that of the civil power, they say: a supremacy of the rich, the cunning, and the commonplace. The Boisdeffre, Pellieux, and Gonse of the État-Major, are much the same as the Méline, Cavaignac, and Dupuy of politics, and the Brunetière, Bourget, and Lemaitre of literature. All unite (singing, as they do, on one side, the "national defence," to the tune of the bordereau, and, on the other, the chant of liberty) in claiming that the army is above and beyond all public discussion.

But the day when the order of mobilization is given it will be realized that *the army is the nation.* All sound men, from twenty to forty-five years, will be called to arms. It will be the reconstitution of the National Guard, which was suppressed after the Commune on the ground that it was a standing menace to the established order. But the new National Guard will be infinitely more dangerous than the old: it will be composed of perfectly drilled soldiers with a very superior armament. The proletariat, with the sentiments we have described, and with many painful souvenirs of their military service, would be enrolled under the flag, and would await the first opportunity of taking action. Events would succeed each other rapidly. France would certainly be invaded, as we have seen, and they who know the French character can imagine the cries that would be heard. *Nous sommes trahis! Nous sommes vendus! C'est '70 qui recommence!* After the first reverse the revolutionary socialists could count their adherents by hundreds of thousands; after the second, they would be masters of the situation.

It may be objected that the proletariat would be incapable of turning the situation to advantage. It is possible: it is far from certain. From the strictly military point of view there are many able officers in the French army,

generally of a subordinate rank. It is an error to suppose that a general knows so much more than a captain. Like other sciences, militarism is only a science up to a certain point. Once this purely technical ground is covered, there comes into play a faculty which can only reveal itself on the field of battle. It is a great mistake to judge France by the figures that habitually appear in its political and military columns. English readers are gravely misled by doing so. France is really a country that is being cheated of its intelligence.

Naturally, France would need an immense energy to triumph over the difficulties which would be created by a revolutionary movement in presence of the enemy. The vast change contemplated in the social order would arouse considerable enthusiasm, and, certainly, no one must suppose that all energy is extinct in France, because its internal condition has been so pitiful of late years. In 1771, Helvétius wrote of the France of that period: "Cette nation avilie est aujourd'hui le mépris de l'Europe. Nulle crise salutaire ne lui rendra la liberté. C'est par la consomption qu'elle périra: la conquête est le soul remède à ses malheurs." Twenty years afterwards this "abject nation" arose from the dust with a miraculous energy, wrought a revolution which, however one may estimate it, is

one of the greatest movements of modern times, and towered menacingly over the whole of Europe. One must not be too hasty in speaking of the decrepitude of the French nation. And the sight of a renovated French republic, acting for the first time as a republic, would create a profound sensation in Europe. The proletariat has pretty much the same sentiments all over the continent. Germany, the great country which destiny has long kept in chains, would probably welcome an opportunity of flinging off its Prussian bonds. Germany was not made to be an enemy of France, where she finds much sympathy in intellectual circles. It is not impossible that the two great nations might join hands at last, and proceed to a social regeneration, with the help of their six million bayonets, of which disarmament would be the crowning triumph.

It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that there are great numbers who trust that to-morrow will not be the development but the revenge of to-day, hence the hypothesis we have sketched demands serious attention. If it presents no particular signs of impracticability, if it is not utterly impossible, it must surely have entered into the calculations of the ruling Powers. It is to be presumed that they have taken, or decided to take, certain measures, in anticipation

of it. We do not speak of the anti-anarchist conference: the anarchism we are dealing with here has nothing in common with the group of assassins who appropriate that philosophic title. But it is probable that the Governments have taken some concerted measures in view of the possibilities we have described. The following chapter will examine the probable nature of these measures.

CHAPTER V

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

In the light of the preceding chapters, and apart from the hypothesis we have just described, the difficulty of removing or alleviating the burden of militarism is seen to be much greater than is generally supposed. If that problem is confronted merely in a philanthropic, or even in a political mood, there seems to be no present hope of surmounting the stubborn obstacles to its solution. The world at large realizes that it is heavily burdened and hampered in its progress by its modern coat-of-mail. Yet it sees nothing but confusion, political and economic, if it disarms. Strong passions throb in the hearts of the nations—anger, revenge, vanity, and covetousness. The preachers of the gospel of peace cast their seed on the rocks and amidst thorns. Governments are powerless to curb the passions of their subjects. One foresees only an utter failure for the Congress they are arranging.

That is—if one supposes that the Governments are actuated only by the humanitarian or political motives with which they are generally credited. But another hypothesis has been put forward in explanation of the current agitation. Governments have, in point of fact, not a paternal, but a purely political and external relation to the nations they guide. When the stream of national life runs strong, they do but study the current, and are practically guided by it. There is, however, another force to be reckoned with in problems of this nature—the power of religion. It is a force that crosses the iron-bound frontiers of the nations, links the most conflicting elements in some of their deepest feelings, and has had a profound influence on the course of European history. Suppose this force were co-operating in a most intimate and effective form with the heads of the States.

It is not religion in the wider sense, the religious sentiment, which could be credited with any power in this direction. The world is withdrawing its secular interests more and more from the dictation of the churches. Indeed, religion as a purely spiritual force has already given ample proof of its utter inability to curb the passions that lie at the base of the military system. For more than fifteen centuries it had a supreme influence over humanity—an influence

which it does not even dream of recovering. During that period it has had no effect whatever on the bellicose spirit of the nations. If there are signs to-day of the birth of a better spirit, they have only appeared since humanitarian and ethical work have been, at least partially, divorced from the work of the churches.

However, there is one form of religion, the main branch of Christianity, whose activity is not by any means of an exclusively spiritual character. The Church of England and the Greek Church have a political complexion, to a certain extent. In reality, they have no political force whatever. Like the innumerable minor and later branches of the Christian religion, they have power only in so far as they can appeal to the religious sentiment of their members. The Papacy is a power of an entirely different, a unique kind. It possesses an organization which surpasses in effectiveness even its ancient imperial model. Its hierarchy is credited by its members with an authority of a transcendent nature. It has a political and diplomatic machinery of a most elaborate character—and at present it is ruled by one of the ablest diplomatists in Europe. In England, the Church of Rome has no very tangible influence as yet, and its English authorities are incapable of any great political influence. Hence Englishmen are apt to neglect continental

appreciations of the action of the Vatican. Rumours of its secret activity are relegated to the same shelf as anecdotes about disguised Jesuits. In order, therefore, to understand more clearly the suggestion of Papal influence in the question of disarmament, it will be useful to review, briefly, the relations of Rome to France and Russia (the two powers most interested in disarmament) during the last few years.

The outbreak of the Franco-German war necessitated a withdrawal of the French troops from Rome, and on September 20, 1870, the army of Victor Emmanuel entered the Papal City. During the war and the long siege of Paris the protests of Pius IX. passed unheeded in France, but no sooner had an armistice been concluded between the Powers than the clerical party at once commenced operations. A reactionary and clerical majority was returned at the election of February 1871, a majority that was ready to accept peace even on the most humiliating terms, and that finally, on March 1, voted the dismemberment of France, only 107 members protesting against that calamitous step. Their further plan, however, of raising the Comte de Chambord to the throne was interrupted by the breaking out of the Commune (largely a protest against the humiliating surrender) on March 18. The fierce repression of that movement, the

careful obliteration of all traces of its activity, and the building of the national church of the Sacred Heart at Montmartre, in expiation of its crimes, gave greater power than ever to the clerical majority. In every school in France the children sang—"Sauvez Rome et la France au nom du Sacré Cœur." The imaginations of the people were inflamed with pictures of Pius IX. dying of hunger on the damp straw of a dungeon in the Vatican. Nothing was spoken of except an expedition to restore the Papal States to his Holiness, and, in the meantime, the collection of Peter's Pence was vigorously conducted—contribution to it became a test of good citizenship.

Had there been an abler politician at the Vatican at that period, it is certain that the Monarchy would have been restored in France, and that the restoration of the Papal States would have immediately followed. But the policy of the French clerical party was crude and ill-advised, and Pius IX. was incapable of rising to his opportunity. Had Leo XIII. occupied the papal chair in 1871—the Leo XIII. of ten years ago—European history would have run a different course. A little more moderation in parading their triumph, a closer appreciation of the opposing minority and a less harsh and vindictive conduct towards it; above all, a

pretence of interest in the working-classes and their aspirations, and the clerical reaction would have been crowned with success. But Pius IX. had little of the clear-sightedness, astuteness, and adaptability of the present Pope. Zealous, sincere, demonstrative, incautious,—he was not an able ecclesiastical statesman. More attentive to principle than policy, frankly eloquent of his rights and wrongs, in season and out of season, he guided the Church well when little more than energetic routine work was necessary, but he marred its destiny in the finest opportunity it has had in this century of recuperating much of its former power.

The choice of the Comte de Chambord as candidate for the throne had been dictated by the Vatican, but it was impolitic. The Count himself was sadly deficient in tact and accommodation. He insisted on retaining the white flag of the elder branch of the Bourbons, in place of the tricolour, and thus sowed dissension in the ranks of the Conservatives. The establishment of the republic was voted, by a majority of one voice. During the ensuing presidency of Thiers, the clericals intrigued very actively, and at length, in 1873, Marshal MacMahon replaced Thiers at the head of the republic. During the whole of this period the tactics of the clerical party were most crude, primitive, and narrow-

minded. They opposed the diffusion of education, created one unceasing round of processions and pilgrimages, and carried on a most bitter and foolish war with the anti-clericals. At length, when they considered that they had sufficiently prepared the people for a change of Government, they inspired MacMahon with the *coup d'état* of May 16, 1877, which they thought the country would ratify at the following elections, and which would pave the way for the "king's" return. During the few months that followed they gave free vent to their feelings, convinced that they would win at the elections. The pulpit resounded with declamations against the republic, democratic institutions, and the spirit of progress. Municipal institutions were bullied by the *curés*. Thousands of officials of liberal views were persecuted and deprived of their positions. Persons who had died without the sacraments of the Church had to be buried before six o'clock in the morning—putting their corpses on a level with domestic refuse. Everywhere the question was raised of restoring the temporal power of the Pope. However, the elections turned against them. In spite of Government and clerical pressure the country voted a republican majority. The crisis was over, and the opportunity lost—probably for ever. Pius IX. died soon afterwards, and was succeeded in 1878

by Leo XIII. Marshal MacMahon had to yield, at length, to the growing republican opposition, and he was replaced by M. Jules Grèvy on January 30, 1879.

It was now the turn of the anti-clericals to attack, and, with a sound republican majority under the presidency of Grévy, they retaliated with vigour. Laws were passed making education free, secular, and obligatory, the clericals murmuring in vain against the *écoles sans Dieu*. Anti-clerical publications multiplied indefinitely. Religious demonstrations out of doors were forbidden. In 1881 Jules Ferry obtained the support of the law to expel all non-authorized religious congregations (including the Jesuits and Dominicans) from France. The clericals made a feeble resistance, but the congregations in question were swept out of the country.

The anti-republican feeling of the clergy was now far from diminishing, but it became more secret and disguised. The new Pope, Leo XIII., more penetrating than his warm-hearted, blundering predecessor, made an entire change of tactics, or silently awaited an opportunity of doing so. He felt that the time was ill-suited for affirming the right of ecclesiastical interference in French politics, and, whilst he deplored the "errors" of the republic, he gave no encouragement to a direct attack upon it. There were other troubles,

too, that demanded his immediate attention. He was busy in bringing to an end the German Kulturkampf, and in reforming the religious orders. Leo XIII. has made an effort (partially successful, as yet) to undo the democratic constitution of the orders as much as possible, whilst restoring the democratic character of their propaganda. These preoccupations diverted papal activity from France for a time, and the clerical party had to be content with a nerveless and piteous opposition. The Pope fully realized that only through France had he any hope of recovering his temporal power, and he patiently awaited an opportunity of commencing a new and a wiser policy in that country.

The opportunity presented itself in 1887. After the election of Ferdinand as Prince of Bulgaria (July 7, 1887) the Tsar withdrew from the triple alliance of Austria, Russia, and Germany. The German Chancellor hastened to bring Italy into the vacant place in the alliance. Thus there arose two circumstances in the political world which must have inspired the Pope with the idea of commencing his new policy. On the one hand, Russia was isolated in Europe, apparently without means of concluding the loans which she needed, in face of the evil dispositions of her north-western neighbours and the hostility of England. On the

other hand, Italy, which had taken advantage of the misfortunes of France in 1870 to seize the temporal power of her *protégé*, now joined a league which was obviously directed against France. It seems impossible that the well-informed and skilful diplomatist who now occupies the papal chair should not have seen in these circumstances a new point of departure.

Moreover, on December 1 of the same year, another incident arose, which would influence the papal disposition. M. Grévy was obliged, after certain grave scandals, to resign the presidency of the republic, and he was succeeded by M. Carnot. This gave the Pope an excellent opportunity for inaugurating the policy which the changes in the political world seemed to prescribe for him. For the commencement of that policy it was necessary that he should enter into more or less intimate relations with those in high places. Under Grévy, a statesman without convictions, cynical and anti-clerical by temperament and policy, that was impossible. Carnot was a man of a very different type; a specimen of honest, religious mediocrity, far inferior in intelligence to Grévy. He was not ostentatious of his religious sentiments; yet he was one of the faithful, and his wife and family were fervent Catholics, so that he was accessible to clerical influence. With such a man, imbued with

definite convictions and proper sentiments (perfectly innocent, moreover, of any acquaintance with Machiavellianism), the Pope could enter upon his new *rôle* with some prospect of success.

What were the first steps that led up to a *rapprochement*, and what negotiations actually took place, it is still much too early to hope to ascertain. Indeed, nothing will ever be known of them from the ecclesiastical side. Ecclesiastical biographies undergo too rigorous a censorship. Still, we find ample confirmation in the subsequent course of events of this theory of the Papal policy. It is remarkable that the Vatican entirely abstained from participation in the Boulangist agitation. Reactionaries of every class joined in the movement, and Pius IX., had he lived, would almost certainly have urged the clericals to cast in their lot. Leo XIII. probably suspected the final overthrow of the movement, and warned the leading prelates not to compromise themselves in the matter. It is not improbable, indeed, that M. Constans was acquainted with the Vatican projects, and was not opposed to them. In any case we can raise the veil a little with the help of subsequent events. One of the first effects of the new *rapprochement* is seen in the attitude of Government towards the religious congregations

who had been expelled. Before Carnot had been three years in the presidency, the law of 1881 had become a dead letter. Though there was no change made in the law, the religious bodies returned into the country and quietly took possession once more of their convents and schools (one special feature of which is the training of youths for the military schools). There was a deliberate abstention from enforcing the law on the part of the Government.

It is remarkable, too, that this *rapprochement* between France and the Vatican should coincide with a *rapprochement* between France and Russia. At the very time that the relaxation of the religious orders commences, and the anti-clerical campaign begins to slacken, there are the first signs of the understanding between France and Russia. In 1891, under the Ministry which saw the fall of Boulangism, and of which M. Constans was a member, two important incidents arose. The first was the visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt. The second was the floating of the first Russian loan in France. This loan was to have been negotiated by the Rothschilds, but they withdrew on the Tsar's refusal to discontinue the persecution of the Jews in Russia. The French syndicate which had undertaken preceding Russian loans of a simpler character proceeded to take over the new loan.

The Government actually strengthened its action by an application of the Crédit Foncier—an operation which was without precedent in a foreign loan—and the success of the negotiation was complete.[1] During the following months the Government continued to give proofs of a conciliatory spirit to the Vatican, and of friendly sentiments to Russia. Russian officers were admitted into the *bureaux* of the Ministry of War, and given all the information they desired. Russian guns were made in the French State-factories. Nihilists were tracked all over France, and some of them arrested and imprisoned on a charge of implication in an alleged plot.

But it is in the year 1893, the year of the definite conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance, that this double *rapprochement* manifests itself, and we see very significant tokens of papal activity. In January the monarchists made a supreme effort to dissuade the Pope from the pro-republican attitude he had adopted. Their efforts proved unavailing, the Pope declaring that he had given a decisive *mot d'ordre*. About the same time he created two new French cardinals,

[1] This loan was followed by others. It is calculated that at the present day, if private loans and all Russian financial and industrial affairs which have solicited French money are added, France has placed in Russia no less than 10,000,000,000 francs.

the Archbishops Meignan and Thomas, and there were some remarkable expressions in the allocutions which the prelates delivered on receiving the hat from the hands of M. Carnot. Mgr. Meignan said—"Dans ma fierté de Français et de Catholique, j'ai tressailli de bonheur en voyant le souverain pontife multiplier envers la France, la fille ainée de l'église,[1] *ses marques de confiance et de prédilection.* L'autorite du Saint Père *s'emploi fermement à l'extinction* des divisions entre les gens de bien qui affaiblissent, lorsqu'ils se combattent, leur action sociale et politique." In the allocution of Mgr. Thomas such expressions as the following frequently occur—"Telle est l'œuvre de paix à laquelle, prêtres et évêques nous sommes heureux de coopérer, *ne demandant en retour que la justice et la liberte!* . . . A la vérité des grandes transformation s'accomplissent. . . . Que la France garde la trempe chrétienne de son caractère et de son génie, *qu'elle resserre les liens de l'antique alliance avec l'église*, qu'elle parle et agisse résolument comme la grande nation Catholique! Alors, aux applaudissements de ses fils, et sous la bénédiction de Léon XIII., *elle marchera à la tête des peuples* dans les renovations qui se préparent et dans toutes les conquètes de la civilisation." . . . M.

[1] In this and the following quotations the italics are ours.

Carnot replied—"Nous venons d'entendre avec une patriotique satisfaction le language élevé dans lequel Vos Eminences, s'inspirant de la pensée du Saint Siège, *et commentant ses enseignements*, ont affirmé leurs sentiments à l'égard de la société civile, etc."

In the same month Mgr. Mignot had an audience with the Pope, and, on his return, delivered an address in the cathedral at Marseilles. "Il y a en Léon XIII.," said he, "une énergie sans seconde. 'J'aime la France,' m'a-t-il dit, 'je l'aime parce qu'elle est la grande civilisatrice. . . . Dites bien à vos fidèles que je ne fais pas de politique . . . je ne demande qu'une chose aux hommes intelligents qui n'ont pas la foi: la tolérance. . . . Ah! *si vous saviez combien j'ai eu à lutter pour assurer à votre pays la prépondérance qu'il doit posséder à si juste titre!* Je ne puis rien vous dire de plus.' Léon XIII. s'est tenu dans la plus grande réserve après avoir prononcé ces paroles, mais le cardinal Rampolla, son ministre d'état, m'en a dit davantage. Il m'a raconté combien Léon XIII. était harcelé par l'Allemagne, l'Angleterre, et l'Autriche, au sujet du protectorat des missions. Menaces, promesses, le pape a tout écouté, comme il a tout dédaigné."[1] About the same

[1] Compare the recent declaration of the Pope to the French pilgrims, on the eve of the Emperor's pilgrimage.

date Mgr. Lécot was writing from Rome, in a pastoral—"À une évolution nouvelle des forces sociales, Dieu a donné un modérateur ingénieux et puissant qui dirigera le mouvement sans en comprimer la force et saura maintenir toutes ses aspirations dans la justice et la vérité."

In March the Pope wrote a letter, destined for publication, to M. Chesnelong, one of the leaders of the monarchists. It expressed an ardent wish that the monarchists would accept the counsels of the Holy See in the interest of religion. On March 17 died Jules Ferry, the author of the law of '81, expelling religious congregations, and of the law of '82, making primary education obligatory. Since 1887 he had been bitterly insulted. He was the most dangerous enemy of the Papal policy. A great and beneficent statesman, he had endeavoured to turn the mind of his country from the spectre of *revanche*, and to come to an *entente* with Germany. In the same month the Pope decided to admit the cause of the beatification of Jeanne d'Arc.

In the following month the Government relaxed its treatment of a number of prelates who had been affected by a measure of suspension. Mgr. Larue, describing his audience at the Vatican, attributed these words to the Pope—"Le bien des âmes exige en ce moment deux choses: la première, c'est que les Catholiques acceptent

sans arrière-pensée le gouvernement établi : la seconde, c'est qu'ils soient fortement unis. . . . L'union des évêques au pape, l'union des prêtres et des fidèles à leurs évêques, l'union enfin des fidèles, non seulement entre eux, mais avec les hommes d'ordre de tous les partis, *lors même qu'ils ne pratiqueraient pas, pourvu qu'ils soient respectueux des droits de l'église* et au besoin disposés à les défendre." At the same time the bishops published instructions to their clergy to direct special prayers and to intervene vigorously in the approaching electoral campaign. On April 27 the Pope gave an audience of an imposing form to the Grand Duke Wladimir, brother of Alexander III.: he had previously emphatically refused to see any prince who came to Rome for the silver wedding of the king and queen. Shortly afterwards the Tsar authorized the sending of a special envoy to the Vatican with the title of "ecclesiastical agent." This agent was to be under the orders of the Minister of Worship, not under the control of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, so that he could be in direct touch with the Russian Cabinet. The Pope decided, also, to raise two more French bishops to the cardinalate. The ceremony of receiving the hat was accompanied by speeches similar to those already quoted.

Meantime the clergy continued their energetic

campaign in favour of the *ralliés* who were recommended by the bishops. On August 3 the Pope (who had recently published a political encyclical) wrote an important letter to the Archbishop of Bordeaux, in which he urges both faithful and prelates more strongly than ever to rally to the republic. Noting with satisfaction that the efforts increased daily in favour of peace and concord—efforts which he had "préconisés avec énergie et renouvelés à de fréquents intervalles"—he goes on to say: "Cela nous donne l'espoir heureux qu'il s'approche, ce temps fortuné et l'objet de tous les désirs où la paix s'établira d'une façon solide et où, grâce à elle, la nation Française pourra réunir ses forces dispersées et les faire servir toutes au bien commun." That was an outline of his policy of some importance to our subject. He inveighs strongly against those Catholics who have had the audacity to disregard his counsels, thus practically putting the electors under episcopal orders. With the connivance of the Government, he has become the supreme elector in France. Only moderate, religious, and (nominally) republican candidates must be supported. On August 15 the cause of the beatification of the Jesuits who had been shot by the Communists was discussed at Rome.

On August 16, four days before the elections,

there occurred a curious event which materially assisted the Papal cause. Serious disturbances arose at Aigues-Mortes between French and Italian workmen: eight were killed and a large number wounded. The cause of the quarrel is still mysterious, but, when the news reached Italy, the country was profoundly agitated, and there were many manifestations against the French, especially at Rome and Naples. The crowd broke the windows of the French embassy and endeavoured to set fire to the building. The French College, also, had its windows broken, and the Papal shield torn down and destroyed. The affair seemed to fire the train of a social movement of great energy—one which recent events show to be far from suppressed. There were numerous conflicts with the police; a riot at Naples; serious troubles in Sicily; anarchist outrages, etc. On the top of all came the great bank scandals. The *Moniteur de Rome* published an article which attracted much attention, and for which it was confiscated. The article ended with these words—"L'organisme politique italien est vicié profondément sans qu'il y ait possibilité de le purifier et de l'assainir. Il n'y aurait qu'un seul remède, remède énergique sans doute, mais sauveur, qui serait la source d'une nouvelle vie: la réconciliation avec la papauté. Nous doutons que les hommes diri-

geants de l'Italie actuelle aient le courage d'y recourir, et ce sera tant pis pour le régime actuel. Il achèvera de se dissoudre dans la décomposition de tous ses organes, usés et corrompus, jusqu' au jour de la liquidation complète. Putrescat ut resurgat." Seeing that it is the policy of the Holy See to disparage the Italian Government which had deprived it of the Papal States, to demonstrate its impossibility, and to foster a hatred of Italy in France, nothing could have been more favourable to its plans, on the eve of the elections, than the events of Aigues-Mortes. On the 20th the elections took place, and the result was a triumph for the Papal policy. A nominally republican majority was returned, moderate to the verge of reaction, mediocre and invertebrate. The leading anti-clericals had been the object of a most violent campaign, and even Clémenceau lost his seat.

On September 14 the Pope wrote another letter, urging the French clergy to political action. Writing to Mgr. Boyer, he protested that his only aim was "to heal the nation of the wounds inflicted on it by the iniquity of the times and of men," and to strengthen the unity of the Catholics. "Les besoins des temps présents," he said, "vous ordonnent de veiller à ce que vos prêtres attachent une importance toute particulière aux dangers dont la patrie est

menacée. . . Contre ces maux le salut unique et certain se trouve dans l'église et dans ses ministres." It was another inculcation of the doctrine of the recent encyclical: the clergy must watch closely and intervene as actively as possible in the course of political events. What was the Government doing during all this interference? The activity of the clergy was open and demonstrative; the pointed instructions from the Vatican were published to the whole world. Anti-clerical laws still existed, and the Government could have grievously harassed the prelates if it resented their propaganda. In what coin did the Papacy pay for this permission to intrude in the internal politics of the country? There seems to be very sound reason for the conjecture that the policy was ultimately connected with the Franco-Russian alliance, which was beginning to engross public attention.

It is to be noticed that there was a close connection between the interests of the Pope and of the Tsar. Both were considerably uneasy at the prospect of an *entente* with Germany: the Pope, on account of Germany's connection with Italy and implication in the loss of the Papal States; the Tsar, since he had just abandoned the Triple Alliance. The anti-clerical policy of Jules Ferry tended in the direction of an *entente* with Germany. The clerical policy which supplanted

it naturally favoured an *entente* with Russia. Moreover, from the purely patriotic point of view, there were grave difficulties in the way of a *rapprochement* between France and Russia. There were the souvenirs of 1812, '14, and '15; of the Crimean war in 1854. There was the fact that Russia had certainly assisted Germany in '70 by its declaration of neutrality, which left Germany free to employ the troops from her eastern frontier. Until about 1887 Russia had been rather hostile to France—of whose disasters, moreover, she had taken advantage in tearing up the Treaty of Paris. Hence the agents who finally led the French people to adopt the principle of an alliance with autocratic Russia must have been powerful to a degree. When one studies, in the French Press of the preceding years, the gradual education and preparation of the public—and the proportionate fostering of an hostility to Italy—their astuteness and ability is surprising. The French diplomacy of the period was incapable of it. Moreover, the difficulties were of that patriotic character which a cosmopolitan force alone can overcome. That force, that able and persevering diplomacy, are easily recognized in the Papacy, and the whole of the circumstances seem to point to a papal intervention.

On October 13 occurred the principal event

of the year, from the point of view of international politics—the arrival of the Russian squadron at Toulon. It was the first official notification of the dual alliance. Splendid *fêtes* were held at Toulon, Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles. Enormous sums of money were spent in welcoming the Russian navy, and the popular enthusiasm was indescribable. Whether or not we grant the hypothesis of Papal influence, the clergy were too discreet to boast of it. They merely joined cordially in the general rejoicing, and hailed the alliance as a blessing. Cardinal Richard, in ordering special prayers and services at Paris, said—"Dans cette cordiale et patriotique union des deux peuples, nous aimons à reconnaitre une bénédiction de Dieu sur notre patrie, un gage de paix et de sécurité pour l'Europe." The critics of the Church bitterly reproached it for its political intrigues. Ex-Père Hyacinthe Loyson, in his *Testament*, accused the Church of having fallen into a heresy which Bossuet declared to be the worst of all heresies—"l'hérésie de la domination. Je ne crois pas," he said, "à la République positiviste et athée, même après l'alliance que le Pape vient de contracter avec elle. Le Pape et le Czar ne sauraient suppléer à la conscience et à Dieu." It would seem that policy only, and the desire not to excite suspicion of her ulterior object, prevented

the Church from affirming her share in the alliance.

The alliance once firmly established (it is unnecessary to recall the subsequent visits of the Tsar to France, and of M. Felix Faure to Russia), the clergy continued their policy of active interference in French internal politics. The new force in the political world, Socialism, which was threatening to withdraw the proletariat from clerical influence far more than free-thought had done, was met by the creation of a "Christian Socialism." Centres of Catholic workmen were founded everywhere, and the clergy, inspired by the encyclical, "De conditione opificum," began to find an intense interest in economic questions. Cardinal Lécot intervened in the great strike at Bordeaux, and was compared by the Press to Cardinal Manning, "l'éloquent pacificateur des grévistes des docks de Londres." The Comte de Mun, the principal apostle of the new movement, declared in his discourse at the Catholic Congress at Toulouse—"Au risque de paraître un excessif, je dirai: Ce qu'il faut protéger, ce n'est pas le capital, c'est le travail! Il ne faut pas laisser croire que l'église est un gendarme en soutane qui se jette contre le peuple, pour protéger le capital; il faut, au contraire, qu'on sache qu'elle agit dans l'intéret et pour la défense des faibles. Quand le peuple saura cela, quand il sera con-

vainçu que l'église n'est pas faite pour la richesse, alors nos efforts seront près d'aboutir, et la pensée du Saint Père sera realisée. 'Répétez cela,' m'-a-t-il dit, '*parlez souvent de l'action sociale de l'église.*'"

Then the clerical educational work was once more in full activity. Cases were quoted of children from the *écoles communales* (in which religious instruction is forbidden) buying pious "histories" with their half-pence and devouring them. The religious congregations re-opened their schools everywhere—in the teeth of the law. Pupils were advanced from them to the magistrature and, especially, to the army. In the army the clerical propaganda became most intense (and continues to-day). The laws were regarded as non-existent. Military chaplains, suppressed by law, are found in nearly every garrison. Associations and other pious military works were founded everywhere; especially the *œuvre de Notre Dame des Armées.* The heads of the army everywhere set the example of interest in the clerico-military societies.

The clergy were attentive, also, to the vast sums of French money which had been placed in Russia (more than 10,000,000,000 francs, as we stated above). There was a feeling prevalent, especially in the provinces, that a renewal of

the anti-clerical campaign would have the effect of weakening the new alliance, and thus endangering their financial interests. Such a feeling was cleverly manipulated by the clergy and the clerical Press. So it was, too, with the Panama and other scandals. They served the clerical purpose admirably. It was easy to point out that such catastrophes were sure to fall upon a "godless" nation, and the moral was readily accepted by numerous victims of the disasters.

Finally, there was a conspicuous instance of the activity of the clericals in Madagascar. The first French governor of the island, M. Laroche, a Protestant, endeavoured to preserve an impartial attitude towards all missionaries. The clerical party attacked him with extreme violence. On December 7, 1896, his recall was bitterly demanded in the Chambre. M. de Mahy, one of the speakers, made a rabid attack upon the Biblical Societies (resting his opposition, of course, on a patriotic basis), and demanded that they and M. Laroche should be put out of Madagascar. The governor was recalled, disgraced, and replaced by the harsh reactionary General Gallieni. The state of the island under the new clerical governor may be inferred from the following words of M. Berthelot, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, on March 16, 1897—"La politique adoptée par la France à

Madagascar peut parfaitement justifier l'Angleterre et les États-Unis à faire les plus sérieuses représentations au gouvernement Français."

So patent and alarming has this clerical activity become in recent years that the Government has frequently been interpellated on the subject. MM. Mirman, Rabier, Dron, and others have protested in the Chambre. M. Joseph Fabre, by no means an extremist or alarmist, has interpellated in the Sénat. M. Fabre demanded of the Government "de n'admettre aucune intervention étrangère (papal) dans la politique intérieure de la France, et d'appliquer avec vigilance toutes les lois qui protègent la société civile contre les empiétements des autorités ecclesiastiques." He maintained, "qu'il existe un péril clérical qu'on doit prendre au sérieux, *sinon au tragique*, voila qui est pour moi l'évidence même." M. Loyson said, in a letter to him on the subject—"L'utopie collectiviste est sans avenir. . . . Mais une république plus ou moins cléricale est possible. Je dirai même qu'elle est probable si nous continuons longtemps dans nos errements." On the eve of the last elections even the English Press declared—"The Vatican is making the most strenuous efforts to aid in the establishment of a majority with Conservative tendencies in France, and to this end the Cardinal Secretary

of State is maintaining constant relations *both with the French Government and Episcopate.*" M. Léon Bourgeois protested, and accused the Government of protecting enemies of the republic. At every protest the Vatican's "majority with Conservative tendencies" voted the order of the day as usual. M. Bourgeois is to-day a minister in a (nominally) Radical cabinet. Has that cabinet made any protest against the *menées cléricales*, or attempted to enforce the laws? The other day General Jamont assisted at the distribution of prizes at the Dominican college at Arceuil, when Père Didon made a violent attack on the civil power. Jamont was slightly blamed, but the Radical cabinet took no step to set the laws in motion against Père Didon and the Dominican college. How is it that the Government grants so extraordinary an interference to the clerical party? Obviously because there is a bilateral contract—*do ut des.* And when one studies carefully the historical retrospect we have made, it would seem that the Russian Alliance is the Pope's share in the contract.

The question what end the Pope had in view in negotiating the alliance leads us to a fuller exposition of the Vatican policy. In the first place, there is no question of sentiment in the matter. No one would discuss seriously for a

moment the question of Leo XIII.'s affection for republican institutions. And it is open to doubt whether he has any special sympathy with France, beyond that vague general sympathy which a man of his station and intelligence could not help feeling. His intimate friendship with Cardinal Zigliara, his collaborator on his encyclicals and (though French) a virulent gallophobe, raises some suspicion on the point. It is curious, too, that the ardent affection of Leo XIII. for France came into existence so suddenly—and just at the moment when the reconstruction of the Triple Alliance offered him an opportunity of intervening. The francophile sentiments of Cardinal Rampolla are open to a similar suspicion. It is not a matter of sentiment at all. The very able and distinguished diplomacy of the Vatican has some tangible object in view, and no one can doubt that that object is the recovery of the Papal States. In a word, the Papal policy, in its full proportions, seems to be this: to create a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance (which is hostile to the Papal aspiration) by an alliance between France and Russia; then, when the military situation has become intolerable, to pose (indirectly, perhaps, at first) as the benefactor of nations and rulers by negotiating the suppression or reduction of militarism, and to recover the whole or part of the temporal power in the form

of gratitude. That is a hypothesis for which much support can be gathered from contemporary politics.

It is to be noted, in the first place, that the temporal power is indispensable for the full development of the life of the Papacy. It is obvious that the *éclat* of the royal state and dignity would much enhance the Pope's prestige with the faithful. A pope who is imprisoned in his palace, as the faithful are taught to conceive him, rather inspires pity than awe and admiration. It is obvious, too, that the religious or ecclesiastical activity of the Vatican demands that the Eternal City, at least, should be at the Pope's disposition. Every religious order and congregation has its centre at Rome, and the different nations have colleges and institutions in constant touch with the Vatican. This daily intercourse, and the chapters, meetings, pilgrimages, and ceremonies which result from it, are sometimes grievously hampered by the control and interference of an alien civil power. The restoration of at least a part of the temporal power would lead to an intense development of this feature of Catholic life. Financial reasons, also, are at the root of the demand for the restoration of the Papal States. The disappearance of the revenues of the States was supposed to be compensated by the founding of Peter's

Pence. It is well known that the product of this international collection decreases every year, so that the Pope is unable to rely upon the charity of the faithful. He has been forced to undertake financial operations which, to say the least, are not of an exalted character. Whatever may be thought of M. Zola's declarations, certain cases are notorious. Five or six years ago, Macé-Berneau, a financier of a certain kind, founded a bank at Paris, which promised fantastic dividends to its clients. He had the happy thought of offering his services to the Vatican, and they were accepted. The Pope put money in the bank, and for several months received remarkable dividends. M. Macé-Berneau was honoured with an autographed portrait and a special Papal blessing. The crisis came quickly, and many savings were swallowed up which had been attracted by the Papal patronage. The portrait was seized with the furniture of the bank, and sold at public auction. The Nuncio had great difficulty in securing possession of it, at a high price, amidst the general amusement. Finally, a further source of revenue is yielding a diminished profit—the sale of Papal decorations and titles of nobility.

There are strong political motives too for a move in this direction of Papal policy. The Pope is unable to maintain much longer his

attitude of passive resistance to the Government. His resources are failing. A reconciliation with the Government in virtue of certain compensations is out of the question. Moreover, if the Pope could be conceived to acquiesce in such a course, it would be followed by disastrous consequences. It would be the signal for the constitution of a national church in Germany, America, etc.; possibly even in France. Nor is there any greater likelihood of the formation of a new temporal power, outside of Italy. Catholic theologians are almost unanimously agreed that Rome is the *divinely-appointed* centre of the Church. There has been some question of the establishment of the Papacy at Jerusalem. The Italian Government, anxious to rid itself of the cancer at its breast, took the idea seriously, and made inquiries in divers quarters, but without result. In point of fact the Papal party became alarmed, and took precautions that Jerusalem should not be free for the purpose, in case there was an agreement to offer it. There was an undercurrent in the Zionist movement which few in England suspected. However, the fear has passed away. The Vatican is convinced of the absolute necessity of some measure of temporal power at Rome, and its policy is directed in accordance with that conviction.

Now, the Triplice is naturally hostile to the restoration of the temporal power. Italy we need no more than mention; and Germany, who counselled and facilitated the "spoliation," is certainly not yet disposed to witness a restoration. In Austro-Hungary, especially in Hungary, there is a strong Liberal party that seeks to throw off the incubus of ultramontane influence, and is bitterly opposed to the Papal policy. Ever since the encyclical of June 29, 1896, the clerical party has waged a furious war with the Liberals. Populists, Socialists, Anti-Semites, Nationalists, and Separatists have been cleverly enrolled under the ultramontane banner. In Austria, the clericals carried the day at the last elections; in Hungary the Liberals remain in power since 1867. The result is ceaseless friction, and the question of restoring the temporal power considerably aggravates the difficulties.

It was, therefore, the obvious policy of the Vatican to create a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance. No sooner does that policy become clear than we find a *rapprochement* of the Papacy with France, on the one side, and with Russia on the other. Gradually, this is followed by an *entente* between France and Russia, an extraordinary tolerance of Papal interference on the part of France, and, finally, the avowal of

the Franco-Russian alliance. Those are the historical features of the development, and the inference is not ambiguous. At the same time the clerical party still further weakens the Triplice by sowing internal dissension. In Austria the Catholic majority is acutely inflamed against Italy, the "despoiler"; so much so that the Hungarian Press expressed fear of a dislocation of the alliance. Italy, on the other hand, declaims against Austria by the voice of the Iridentists. France is stirred to anger by reminders of the ingratitude of Italy. International irritation takes the form of prohibitive tariffs and crushing increases of armament, to the general discontent. So grave was the situation in Italy that King Humbert lodged his personal fortune in London at the end of 1893.

The rise of this new combination of powers has had the effect of accelerating the pace of militarism, as we have seen. The burden has become heavy and exacting. Yet it is impossible to remove it, unless there is some profound modification, at least, of actual political and economic conditions. A profound change in these conditions can only take place, either in a revolutionary sense, or in a reactionary sense. Military slavery must either give way to liberty or to another kind of slavery. We have already studied the possibilities of a revolutionary change:

it is interesting to work out the possibility of a reactionary transformation.

If one point is clear from the preceding narrative, it is that the Papal policy has undergone a profound change during the last decade or more. That policy has issued in several very remarkable and apparently distinct manifestations. There can be no question, however, about its fundamental unity. We cannot admit a special action in France, another in Italy, etc., without any logical connection. We are in face of so many links in one long chain of effort. Ecclesiastical diplomacy is notoriously secure from documentary disclosures, yet the light of facts has been sufficient to discern the outlines of a general policy. Now, the ulterior aim of this line of conduct is not difficult to conceive. The Vatican would have nothing to gain by a conflict of the two combinations: its interest rather lies in pacification. Universal disarmament is impossible. With a change of conditions, a readjustment of political interests, partial disarmament seems practical. Now, in the general readjustment, it is clear that the feelings of the Catholic world on the temporal power would have to be consulted. Certain small States would have to be declared neutral; it is easy to see that so able a group of diplomatists, with so wide and substantial a base of operation, would

entertain a hope of securing and obtaining a guarantee of neutrality for some portion of temporal power—at least, the Eternal City.

If such an hypothesis of papal policy finds little favour in England, it is only because of our slight interest in international politics and our unfamiliarity with able ecclesiastical statesmanship. The prelates of our English Church have no idea either of statesmanship or of diplomacy. We are at present acutely impressed with their want of cohesion, their want of any definite policy, their utter helplessness, as a political organization, in a grave crisis of their institution. We are misled, too, by the mediocrity and feebleness of the representatives of the Papal Church in England. More than half of whatever influence the Church of Rome has in England is due to its lay following. Cardinal Vaughan and his suffragans, estimable as they are from the purely religious point of view, are but feeble types of the ecclesiastical statesman, and they are almost entirely ignorant of diplomacy. There are only two priests in England who could at all co-operate with Rome, when the country arrives at a condition of maturity (from the Roman point of view).

Hence we are apt, as a body, to minimize the power of the Papacy. We forget that the Vatican cabinet is one of the ablest in Europe;

we forget the necessarily secret character of its operations, the vast power which it derives from its beautifully-constructed organization, the solidity of its fulcrum and the strength of its lever. The Vatican has not lost all hope of accomplishing the Archimedean task of moving the world. Mr. Lecky indicates one feature of its unrivalled power, when he says—"In an age when the world is governed by mere numbers, and therefore mainly by the most ignorant, who are necessarily the most numerous, any organization that has the power of combining for its own purpose great masses of ignorant voters acquires a formidable influence. The facilities the Catholic Church possesses for this purpose are great and manifest, and its interests may easily, in the minds of its devotees, not only dominate over, but supersede the interests of the State." We have had slight illustrations of this in England in the time of Manning: we have powerful illustrations of it in France and Austria. M. Emile Ollivier is one of the best informed writers on the Papacy; he says—"La plupart des prélats Romains pensent que le pape ne saurait plus longtemps persister dans une inertie qui, pour les inattentifs, est un commencement de défaillance ou la promesse d'une reconciliation prochaine [with the Italian Government], pour les fidèles une cause de découragement. Les

encycliques et les protestations platoniques ne produisent plus d'effet ; des actes seuls sécoueraient les esprits : on les appelle, on les attend. Que le pape s'y décide : à l'instant les courages se relèveront. . . . Le pape a la basilique de Saint-Pierre ; au lieu de la laisser comme une veuve qui a perdu son époux, au lieu de n'y déscendre qu'à portes closes devant des invités choisis, qu'il ouvre la *loggia ;* qu'il s'avance escorté de sa cour, de ses cardinaux, de ses prêtres, sous les portiques de Bernini, le jour de *Corpus Domini ;* qu'il visite les malades ; qu'il parcoure le Corso dans son carrosse de gala ; qu'il aille et vienne à travers Rome dans sa majesté de Père, d'Evêque, de Prêtre. La crise éclatera. Et alors on verra ce que valent les garanties Italiennes, et combien les grands Italiens qu'on appelait Balbo, Massimo d'Azeglio, Goberti, avaient été prévoyants de ne pas admettre, même dans l'hypothèse de la destruction du Pouvoir Temporel, qu'un Pape et qu'un Roi puissent librement et dignement séjourner côte à côte dans la même ville. . . . Dans les situations suprêmes, on périt par les complaisances ; on se sauvre par les résistances." The Pope will not have recourse to the means indicated by M. Ollivier except in extremity. But whatever means he employs, the effect will be great, and will overflow the narrow bounds of Italy.

What means the Pope *is* trying is now clear, if this hypothesis of his policy be correct. The apparent surprise and naïve joy of his Holiness at the publication of the manifesto will scarcely mislead. It would have been bad policy, in any case, and less promising of success, if the Pope had appeared frankly as the *deus ex machinâ*. The Conference will meet, and, if it be true that there was an understanding between several rulers and the Pope, a new sort of Holy Alliance, it will be the first of a series. It is impossible to predict how soon there may be a modification of the territorial difficulties. The death of the Emperor Francis Joseph would probably lead to a union of Teutonic Austria to Germany. Germany, with her large accession of Roman Catholic subjects, would have an interest in conciliating the Vatican. It is not impossible that she might, with her empire extended to the Adriatic, return at least Lorraine to France, and compensate Italy, on the Adriatic or in Africa, for a restoration of the Papal States.

Finally, in order to illustrate the idea that disarmament will be more easily effected if Papal diplomacy is involved in the movement, let us examine the question of reduction in France. We have seen that the liberal and capitalistic *bourgeoisie* cannot undo the military system without grave economic disorders, which it will

not face. But the clerical party, once triumphant, could easily reduce the national army to a pretorian footing. It has a basis, not in economics, but in ethics and religion. It can oppose a new force to cupidity and financial uneasiness. It could suppress numerous institutions (educational, etc.) which cost the State dear; suppress, to a great extent, an onerous and complicated administration which is largely occupied in restraining the clergy. It could make an enormous economy, reduce taxation, set up local institutions of credit which would ensure a grateful submission, create syndicates, especially of an agricultural character, and organize an extensive system of colonization, which the actual *bourgeoisie* cannot undertake. The army, say of 150,000 or 200,000 men, an army of mercenaries, under a group of officers of her own training (they are numerous enough already), would serve to police the State; one priest could replace fifty officials and ten policemen. Foreign complications would not be feared, since the new Holy Alliance would exist under the arbitration of his Holiness. Moral and intellectual liberty would disappear. There would be a great increase of material prosperity. We should have Christian Socialism in the concrete.

CHAPTER VI

SOME FORCES AT WORK

To resume the argument, then, there are symptoms of a growing consciousness, on the part of the nations, of the strange military complications in which they have involved themselves. Since the *débacle* of 1871 taught its pernicious lesson of the danger of military inferiority, the process of national armament has proceeded at an appalling rate. The annual publication of statistics, the protests of reformers, and the still more potent stimulus of increased taxation, are gradually bringing home to people the weight of the burden they have taken on themselves and causing a painful anxiety about the future. People are raising themselves to a broad view of the situation, and realizing how largely sterile is the feverish productivity of modern industry through the military system. They cannot help feeling that, *if* it were removed, if the vast machinery of the industrial world could be en-

tirely devoted to the production of the means of enhancing personal comfort and luxury, and if this industrial army could be reinforced, in an orderly and effective manner, with the millions of able workers, of brain and muscle, who are now absorbed in the sterile military system, the world would be little less than transformed. But we have seen that the process of turning swords into ploughshares is a formidable, a repellent undertaking. The condition of the political world at the present day forbids the slightest hope of reduction of armaments. The bellicose spirit which rumbles as the entrails of a volcano at the smallest provocation, which transforms the question of the occupation of a mud-swamp into a question of national honour and a *casus belli*, scarcely encourages us to hope for a diplomatic adjustment of those political conditions. Moreover, the marvellous character of our industrial system, which causes it to cling with ironic fervour to a parasitical growth like militarism, for fear of a painful wound in its structure, considerably increases the difficulty.

We have seen that there are two possible solutions of the problem. It is possible, as was explained in the preceding chapter, that a clerical reaction may be at the root of the agitation for disarmament. Quite recently the Roman correspondent of the *Indépendance Belge* has written

sensational articles on the "dark intrigue directed from Rome which aims at revolution" in France, which strongly confirm the hypothesis sketched in the preceding chapter. Still, one can only attach a limited importance to such an hypothesis. It is not to be neglected, certainly, for the condition of the French army makes one think that a clerico-military *coup* would be dangerous. However, clerical manœuvres only prosper below the surface. The day such a movement betrayed itself it would lose half its force and evoke a large amount of hitherto latent opposition. If successful, its triumph would be relatively brief.

The second possible solution is the one we have described in Chapter IV. That this fearful increase in military armaments will inspire, or intensify, revolutionary sentiments, no one will doubt. It is equally clear, on the other hand, that the wholesale arming of nations puts an irresistible power in the hands of the discontented "have-nots." It is more than possible that the people will become acutely conscious of this power, on the first occasion of a general mobilization, and it is by no means impossible that they will calmly proceed to a readjustment of social and economic conditions. If that were done, the obstacles to disarmament would entirely disappear.

If neither of these solutions of the problem of disarmament can be considered to have any grave probability in its favour, we must look forward to an advance with leaden footsteps towards the fated goal. The invitation of the Tsar has met with a response—however doubtful and hesitating. A Congress of the representatives of the Powers will meet at the beginning of this year for a discussion of the problem. The most sanguine enthusiast does not dream of any striking result from the first Congress, but it will probably be the first of a series of discussions, possibly the nucleus of an international committee of inquiry into the obstacles to disarmament. It may, therefore, be the first step in a serious attempt to grapple with one of the gravest humanitarian problems.

But we cannot help thinking that the project is scarcely whole-hearted enough to achieve even any preliminary results for the time being. The Tsar may have been actuated, in part, by sincere feeling in issuing his manifesto, but there are few politicians who think it entirely due to such a sentiment. Its relation to the actual national and international policy of Russia is disquieting. Other Governments have, on the whole, yielded a grudging assent to his proposal. Now, the project of disarmament is likely to clash so violently with the will of the people in most

nations that so feeble a movement does not seem hopeful of success. Not only does the warlike instinct, or deeply ingrained feeling, survive in almost its full strength; not only does commercial and colonial expansion offer it continual occasions for eruption, but almost every nation is beset with political and economic difficulties which tell very materially in favour of the military system. Militarism has not merely a sentimental basis: it has latterly taken deep root in the fabric of society, and does not seem (to the mass of the nation) capable of eradication except by a vast change or a grave disturbance of that fabric.

Still, there are few outside the professional military coterie who have not faith in the ultimate accomplishment of those conditions of disarmament. The prospect is remote, in truth, but it is written in the decrees of fate. Were a partial disarmament possible, that faith might be fed on instalments of attainment. A *pro rata* reduction is not possible. Not even a professional agitator has yet ventured to say, in so many words, that the stronger Powers would voluntarily abdicate their superior strength, or that the weaker Powers would bind themselves down to a perennial inferiority. We need not repeat the argument. Universal disarmament seems the only practical object, and it must be far remote from the present generation. Time,

however, will witness a removal of the present obstacles, and education will transform that combative instinct and false patriotism which would still obstruct the path of the disarmer. Mere Jingoism and Chauvinism already present symptoms of decay. Sir M. Hicks-Beach and Sir Ashmead-Bartlett do not carry the nation with them in their antiquated ardour; even Mr. Chamberlain's modified fervour is not entirely a success. Such politicians as Delafosse, Déroulède, and Millevoye, find it increasingly difficult to inflame even our neighbours across the Channel.

The truth is that the nations are beginning to suspect the patriotism of these good people. The class to which they usually belong has shown anything but a true patriotism in certain crises. It is the class of manufacturers, financial speculators, etc., who profit largely by war. Birmingham factories sent arms out to the Transvaal at the height of the crisis: an English ship was intercepted with a cargo of arms for the Afridis. There have been reports, too, of swords and bayonets supplied by English manufacturers to the Anglo-Egyptian army, which bent like tin; and the food supplied in the late campaign was responsible for much disease. The French troops in Madagascar were similarly treated in the matter of food, and numerous deaths resulted. During the Franco-German war the same features

were exhibited on a much larger scale. One cannot read M. Darien's graphic description of the invasion from the civilian's point of view (in *Bas les Cœurs*) without a feeling of intense disgust at the rapacity and hypocrisy of the *bourgeois* of the period. Italy experienced similar treatment during the Abyssinian expedition, and America has recently discovered it, to a revolting extent, in her operations in Cuba.

Hence there are not wanting signs of the birth of a saner patriotism than the old Jingoism, or flag-patriotism. The patriotic sentiment is entering upon a curious development. Formerly it was almost wholly a matter of blind and blinding sentiment. It is now seeking a more permanent and solid basis. Broadly speaking, it is the consciousness of the peculiar characteristics of one's race and territory, creating an intense desire to sustain them. Modern science points out the true meaning of racial and territorial distinctions, and inspires a patriotic feeling of attachment to the soil which has given a people birth, and a consciousness of the great advantages they may derive by a scientific development of their peculiar resources. The ugly passions, relics of the Jurassic period, which have clung to and obscured the patriotic sentiment, will tend to disappear as this consciousness spreads and deepens. Once patriotism has been thus purified, one may

entertain some hope of the fraternity of nations, and the peaceful development of their eternal rivalry. The combative instinct will not die out, it is true: only an infatuated peacemaker could wish it to die out. Tolstoianism is the modern representative of that infatuation—the policy or theory of turning the other cheek to the smiter—and the movement is merely a limited agitation round a living personality. The combative instinct is really the palladium of personal dignity. It is the presence of that instinct in the individual which inspires the hatred of injustice and checks its blasting career. It is the transfer of that instinct from individuals to masses—largely by the creation of permanent armies—that has given rise to the stupid international hatreds of modern Europe. The progress of education may be relied upon to correct that merging of personal dignity in a military machinery, to purify the patriotic sentiment, and to supply a basis for the fraternity of nations and the abolition of mailed fists.

Many forces are engaged in this high work of education. The various peace societies have probably the least influence in the work. They seem to be mere groups of idealists, loud-talking, utterly unpractical, too lofty in their speculations to study the real features of the practical problem of disarmament. The search-light of *Truth* has drawn public attention to one element in

their existence. The more serious and sincere are mere theorists, who will make much noise from a back seat, when an international Commission begins its practical deliberations.

Another force which cannot be expected to have any very potent influence in the task of education is religion. The churches will, of course, conduct a simultaneous peace campaign —or rather, a campaign which will be slightly in the rear of the secular agitation—and, when disarmament is finally attained, they will chronicle it as a triumph of religion. But the twentieth century, with the history of the nineteenth before its eyes, will prove a little sceptical. The history of the nineteenth century depicts the churches as in continuous conflict with scientific and humanitarian progress, and then, ultimately, turning to bless and appropriate, when they could no longer resist. In any case, the churches have clearly learned their humanitarian lesson this time from the people. For 1500 years the churches were in high authority—for 1200 years in supreme authority. They did not move a finger in this work of education. They move to-day—because they are moved by the people: though their conversion is not yet complete—witness the speeches of Père Didon and Dulac and the "Dundee Presbytery of the Established Church of Scotland." There is an exquisite

irony in the printing of copies of the Tsar's rescript by the *Daily Chronicle* and offering them to the churches. No one would suspect Mr. Massingham of an insidious affront to Christian ministers, but he cannot have been unconscious of the symbolism of his act. It is the old, old story. But to claim the present humanitarian aspiration as the result of a long-delayed acceptance of Christian principles is the height of absurdity and effrontery.

Much greater will be the influence of the Press. It is curious to note the extent to which the didactic function has been transferred from the pulpit to the Press during the last few decades. The circumstance is not wholly a matter of congratulation, for a very large proportion of the writers of articles and leaders are unfitted, morally and intellectually, for that function. There is a minority of most able and earnest men in the journalistic world, who are fully conscious of their responsibility. Unfortunately they are read by a class which is already capable of discrimination. The larger world of readers, who are incapable of such discrimination, through want of mental development, are left to the guidance of an ambiguous crowd of mediocrities and literary adventurers. Indeed, one of the lighter features of contemporary life is the seriousness with which

journalists read each other (or profess to do) in different countries. However, the responsibility and power which have been thrust upon the modern Press are rarely abused. "Yellow" journals are only too numerous, it is true; unhappily it is the unreflecting masses that are dosed with their pernicious Jingoism. But the Press, as a whole, uses its influence for righteousness. It will do much in the preparation of the nations for the final abandonment of militarism.

And lastly, there is a new element entering into public life which will powerfully assist this educative development. It is the advent of Woman. Woman is coming to take a part in the life of the community which she has never played in the whole history of humanity, and her coming is sure to have an effect on the spirit in which national and international life is conducted. She is abdicating the power which is so crudely expressed in the Lysistrate, and which has made her a source of danger and of suspicion so long. She is rapidly proving her ability to discharge functions for which only masculine strength was once thought capable. That she needs much mental education is obvious: it is not difficult to impart it. But, in view of the ideal of universal peace which we have to work for, man needs a moral and spiritual education which it is *not* easy to impart. One cannot help

thinking that the process will be greatly assisted by the collaboration of woman. It is not her weakness that she will contribute to the conduct of affairs: that will disappear in her struggle for equality of opportunity. It is her characteristics of refinement, sensitiveness, and sympathy which she will contribute. Those are the features which are lacking in the cruder, blunter emotions of the male, and their addition to the inspiring elements of public life will mean a long step towards the ideal of universal peace.

THE END.

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